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Abstract
Denial-of-service/distributed denial-of-service (DoS) attacks on network connectivity are
a threat to businesses that academics and professionals have attempted to address through
cyber-security practices. However, currently there are no metrics to determine how
attackers target certain businesses. The purpose of this quantitative study was to address
this problem by, first, determining differences among business sectors in rates and
duration of attacks and financial damages from attacks and, second, examining
relationship among assets and/or revenues and duration of attacks and financial damages.
Cohen and Felson’s routine activity theory and Cornish and Clarke’s rational choice
theory served as frameworks as they address the motivations and choices within criminal
targeted attacks. Using the Kruskal-Wallis test and Spearman’s correlation analysis, data,
compiled from online database, on 100 U.S. businesses that were attacked in a 19-year
period were analyzed. Kruskal-Wallis test indicated financial and informational sectors
had higher attack rates; educational and informational sectors experienced longer attacks;
and retail and informational sectors suffered greater financial damages. Results of
Spearman’s correlation showed that there was a significant negative relationship between
duration and assets across all sectors but a significant positive relationship between
duration and assets within the financial sector. A key recommendation is for cyber
security professionals to better understand DoS attacks and to develop protections
targeted business sectors. The implications of positive social change include the potential
for security professionals to improve their security defenses from targeted attacks and
trigger scholars to further research using the issues presented in the study.

Denial of Service Attacks: Difference in Rates, Duration, and Financial Damages and the
Relationship Between Company Assets and Revenues
by
Abebe Gebreyes

MPhil, Walden University, 2020
MS, American University, 2003
MA, Howard University, 1996

Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Management

Walden University
October 2020

Dedication
First and foremost, I would like to give honor to my God (Elohim) almighty for
giving me the never-ending perseverance and strength to deal with this strenuous process.
This study is dedicated to my mother, Zenebech Wondim who encouraged me to get
education. I would also like to honor, acknowledge, and dedicate this study to my family,
Emaways Assefa, Abel, Ethael, and Bruk Abebe who endured my long journey for this
doctoral research: I thank you for your support and patience with me during this
protracted journey. I also thank my sister (Yeshi), brothers (Arega, Moges, Getachew,
Teklu, Zewdu, Alemayehu) and relatives for their encouragement and assistance through
this doctoral research process: you contributed everything in your power to make sure I
had the proper resources I need to accomplish my dissertation. I could not have reached
this point without all of you.

Acknowledgments
In this dissertation process, I would like to express my sincere appreciation and
gratefulness to my chairperson, Dr. Robert Haussmann. Dr. Haussmann, I thank you
enormously for your guidance throughout my long journey. I have learnt wisdom and
vision from your immediate and valuable feedback to my research. I give thanks also to
Dr. Ken Levitt my second committee member and methodology expert. Thank you for
accepting my request during a difficult time. Thanks to all of you for ensuring that my
dissertation met the University’s rigorous requirements

Table of Contents
List of Tables ................................................................................................................. vi
Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study ................................................................................1
Background of the Study ............................................................................................4
Problem Statement .....................................................................................................7
Purpose of the Study ..................................................................................................9
Research Questions and Hypotheses ..........................................................................9
Theoretical Framework ............................................................................................ 12
Routine Activity Theory.................................................................................... 13
Rational Choice Theory..................................................................................... 14
Nature of the Study .................................................................................................. 15
Definitions ............................................................................................................... 18
Assumptions ............................................................................................................ 21
Scope and Delimitations .......................................................................................... 21
Limitations............................................................................................................... 22
Significance of the Study ......................................................................................... 23
Significance to Theory ...................................................................................... 24
Significance to Practice ..................................................................................... 25
Significance to Social Change ........................................................................... 26
Summary ................................................................................................................. 27
Chapter 2: Literature Review ......................................................................................... 29
Introduction ............................................................................................................. 29
i

Cyber-Attacks .......................................................................................................... 31
Type of Attacks........................................................................................................ 33
Malware Attacks ............................................................................................... 34
Cryptolocker ..................................................................................................... 35
Denial-of-Services/Distributed Denial-of-Services Attack ........................................ 37
Smurf Attack ..................................................................................................... 39
Fraggle Attack................................................................................................... 39
SYN Flood Attack............................................................................................. 39
The Ping-of-Death Attack ................................................................................. 40
The Teardrop Attack ......................................................................................... 40
Launching DDoS Attacks .................................................................................. 41
Commonly Used Attack Tools ................................................................................. 44
Trinoo.. ............................................................................................................. 44
Tribe Flood Network Tool................................................................................. 45
Stacheldraht Tool .............................................................................................. 46
Shaft….............................................................................................................. 46
Mstream ............................................................................................................ 47
Trinity. .............................................................................................................. 47
Attackers.................................................................................................................. 48
Script Kiddies ................................................................................................... 48
Crackers ............................................................................................................ 49
Hackers ............................................................................................................. 50
ii

Attacking Process .................................................................................................... 51
Reconnaissance ................................................................................................. 52
Scanning ........................................................................................................... 53
Enumeration...................................................................................................... 54
Attacking .......................................................................................................... 55
Cyber-Security ......................................................................................................... 56
Current State of Guardianship ........................................................................... 57
Guardianship Actions ........................................................................................ 62
Problems for Guardianship ................................................................................ 64
Targeted Attacks ...................................................................................................... 65
Motivation ........................................................................................................ 68
Targeted Business Sectors ................................................................................. 71
Financial Damages ............................................................................................ 73
Business Values ................................................................................................ 74
Attack Targeted Metrics ........................................................................................... 76
Theoretical Foundation ............................................................................................ 79
Routine Activity Theory (RAT)......................................................................... 80
Rational Choice Theory (RCT).......................................................................... 85
Summary and Conclusions ....................................................................................... 91
Chapter 3: Research Method .......................................................................................... 94
Research Design and Rational .................................................................................. 95
Methodology............................................................................................................ 96
iii

Population ......................................................................................................... 97
Sampling and Sampling Procedures................................................................... 97
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection ......................... 98
Archival Data ...................................................................................................101
Instrumentation and Operationalization of Constructs ......................................102
Operationalization of Independent and Dependent Variables ............................103
Data Analysis Plan ................................................................................................. 104
Kruskal-Wallis Test .........................................................................................106
Correlation .......................................................................................................108
Threat to Validity ................................................................................................... 109
External Validity ..............................................................................................111
Internal Validity ...............................................................................................112
Construct Validity ............................................................................................113
Ethical Procedures............................................................................................113
Summary ............................................................................................................... 114
Chapter 4: Results ........................................................................................................ 115
Introduction ........................................................................................................... 115
Data Collection ...................................................................................................... 116
Study Results ......................................................................................................... 118
Descriptive Data...............................................................................................118
Kruskal-Wallis Analysis: RQs 1, 2, and 3.........................................................119
Correlational Analyses: RQs 4 and 5 ................................................................123
iv

Summary ............................................................................................................... 127
Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations ........................................ 130
Interpretation of Findings ....................................................................................... 131
Research Question 1 .........................................................................................132
Research Question 2 .........................................................................................133
Research Question 3 .........................................................................................134
Research Question 4 .........................................................................................136
Research Questions 5 .......................................................................................138
Limitations of the Study ......................................................................................... 140
Recommendations .................................................................................................. 141
Implications ........................................................................................................... 143
Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 145
References ................................................................................................................... 148

v

List of Tables
Table 1 Data Types and Sources ..................................................................................100
Table 2 Summary of Data Analysis Approach Per Research Question ..........................105
Table 3 Number of Attacks on the 100 Companies in Each Sector ...............................117
Table 4 Descriptive Statistics for the Dependent Variables...........................................118
Table 5 The Rate of Attacks.........................................................................................120
Table 6 Kruskal-Wallis Rate of Attacks (Dunn Contrasts, Pairwise p Values.) .............120
Table 7 Duration ..........................................................................................................121
Table 8 Kruskal-Wallis Duration of Attacks (Dunn Contrasts, Pairwise p Values.) ......121
Table 9 Financial Loss .................................................................................................123
Table 10 Kruskal-Wallis Financial Loss (Dunn Contrasts, Pairwise p Values.) ............123
Table 11 Spearman Correlations: Duration by Assets ...................................................125
Table 12 Spearman Correlations: Duration by Revenue ...............................................126
Table 13 Correlations: Financial Damage by Assets .....................................................126
Table 14 Correlations: Financial Damages by Revenue ................................................127

vi

List of Figures
Figure 1. Master slave botnet attacks ............................................................................. 45
Figure 2. Elements of routine activity theory.................................................................. 81

vii

1
Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Internet technology has grown from an academic curiosity into a means of
communication, media distribution (Kende, 2014), knowledge warehousing, and business
activities (Hunter, 2016). The Internet has become the medium through which denial-ofservice (DoS) and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks on businesses take place
(Harris & Maymi, 2016; Lee, 2013). Since the late 1990s, the growth of complex DoS
attacks on business sectors has corresponded directly with the growth of the Internet and
its use within diverse services. DoS attacks targeted the availability of services, disrupted
online access, disabled computer functions, and controlled computing systems remotely
(Harris & Maymi, 2016).Growth in the number of Internet-enabled devices and Internet
connectivity across businesses has led to an increase in DoS attacks (Harris & Maymi,
2016; Sood & Enbody, 2014). Protecting companies from targeted DoS attacks is a
challenging task that requires diligence and ingenuity, as those who would attack
Internet-connected systems continue to probe for vulnerabilities and devise new attacks
(Somal & Virk, 2014).
DoS attacks have become the most common types of cyber-security attacks in
business sectors (Conrad, Misenar, & Feldman, 2015). From 2000 to 2019, many
companies faced repeated challenges to cyber-security from DoS attacks. DoS attacks
deplete the availability of the targeted companies’ computer systems, whereas a virus
breaches the systems to search through sensitive data and interrupt normal computing
operations. DoS attacks are harmful for companies’ networks because they block services
and prevent authorized users from controlling the system (Harris & Maymi, 2016).
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By combining different components of DoS attacks, attackers invade a targeted
company’s computer systems. Some DoS assaults allow intruders to install malicious
code onto the target’s systems (Stewart, Chapple, & Gibson, 2015). By using multiple
and differing vectors, attackers increase their chances of success. The more sophisticated
the methods used by attackers, the greater their chances of bypassing cyber-security
defense mechanisms.
Since 1990, the study of cyber-attacks has emerged as a crucial and developing
area in the field of cyber-security. According to Mancuso, Strang, Funke, and Finomore
(2014), cyber-security research is dominated by operational and attack perspectives.
Operational perspectives focus on comprehending and expanding cyber-security
protection. Research within the attack perspective typically focuses on attackers’
principles. Some researchers suggested that operational perspectives dominate existing
research. For example, according to Mulligan and Schneider (2011), most cyber-security
researchers focused on technological (operational) ways to achieve security. Similarly,
Jyothsna, Prasad, and Prasad (2011), Ballora, Giacobe, McNeese, and Hall (2012), and
Langton and Baker (2013) argued that while cyber-security researchers gave attention to
technical aspects, targeting attacks and attackers received little attention. Uma and
Padmavathi (2013) highlighted the absence of a common understanding of various forms
of cyber-attacks, features, and probable outcomes, suggesting a lack of focus on attack
perspective research. Regardless of whether the operational perspective or attack
perspective has received more attention, both have limitations as they do not examine the
metrics of targeted DoS attacks.
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Despite the abundance of literature on cyber-attacks, including research on
targeted business sectors types, researchers have generally not examined the relationships
among DoS attacks, assets, and revenues within specific business sectors (Shakarian,
Shakarian, & Ruef, 2013). Although few scholars indicated additional research is needed
(Harris & Maymi, 2016; Yadav & Gour, 2014), the claim of a research gap is supported
in the literature review where the I describe the existing research on attack metrics in
detail. I examined the differences among business sectors in attack rates, duration of
attacks, and financial damages resulting from attacks as well as the relationship between
company revenues and assets and the duration of attacks and resulting financial damages.
The study involved compiling and analyzing archival data to identify whether these
factors were part of candidate targeting metrics, thereby helping cyber-security
professionals, practitioners, and researchers create higher-level protection and
management of DoS attacks. The findings from this study on DoS attacks could enlighten
security professionals, contribute to the advancement of cyber-security theory, and enrich
the availability of empirical writings on cyber-security. The evolving nature of DoS
attacks requires continuous vigilance for both large and small businesses (Harris &
Maymi, 2016). Better understanding of the factors related to DoS attacks (including
business sector types, assets, and revenues) produced information that could assist future
research.
In Chapter 1, I present the background of the study, problem statement, purpose
of the study, research questions and hypotheses. I also present the theoretical framework,
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nature of the study, definitions, assumptions, scope and delimitations, limitations,
significance of the study, and summary.
Background of the Study
Targeted computer systems attacks did not begin with the creation of Internet.
Business sector security attacks started with wiretapping in the 1970s. Attacks on
computer systems came later, as technology advanced (Moore, 2015). In the 1980s, the
attacker 414 assaulted as many as 60 different computer systems for unlawful gains
(Middleton, 2017). Cyber-security attacks of companies continued to increase throughout
the 1980s (Yar, 2013). A trend of tapping into e-mail systems at both Digital Equipment
Corp and MCI Communications Corporation emerged, and attackers stole $70 million by
targeting the financial sector, including the National Bank of Chicago (Middleton, 2017).
Following the rise in computer system attacks, another trend emerged: virtually injecting
computers with viruses. By 1991, there were more than 1,000 known viruses in computer
systems (Yar, 2006). The Melissa virus, which was spread through e-mail messages,
triggered $500 million in financial damages. Targeted companies and organizations
included AT&T, Griffith Air Force Base, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), and the Korean Atomic Research Institute. In the 1990s,
attackers breached the computer security systems of the Department of Justice, Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), and Department of Defense (Hill & Marion, 2016).
After the 1990s, DoS attackers shifted their focus to attacking the websites of
company sectors and institutions. A new form of cyber-security attacks surfaced. DoS
attackers utilized Transmission Control (TCP), Internet Protocol (IP), and User Datagram
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Protocol for launching attacks. Attackers launched DoS attacks from multiple sources
(Stewart et al., 2015). The DoS attacks on cyber-security systems were serious in the
1990s, but the situation worsened in the 2000s when the Internet took center stage in
technological development and advancement. Attackers coordinated a chain of DoS
attacks against many e-commerce sites, including AOL, Yahoo!, Amazon, and eBay
(Bosworth, Kabay, & Whyne, 2014). Cyber-attacks led to financial losses of $8 billion in
the United States and an average of $1 trillion in cyber-related thefts occurred globally
each year (Yar, 2006). In contrast, business sector attackers carried out attacks with low
cost and with advanced technology (Harris & Maymi, 2016). Since 2000, DoS and its
variant DDoS attacked availability of services on the Internet. Whereas a DoS attack uses
a single computer and an Internet link to flood a targeted system with packets (unit of
data), a DDoS attack involves using multiple computers and Internet connections
(Bosworth & Kabay, 2002; Harris & Maymi, 2016).
In the 2000s, attackers refined their strategies to target companies by using
zombie computers (a compromised computer connected to the Internet, used to forward
transmissions to other computers) to mask the source of the attacks; as many as 37,000
attempted attacks occurred on the government and private companies (Radware, 2017).
In the first quarter of 2009, McAfee researchers detected more than 12 million zombies
(McAfee, 2009). In 2015, over 430 million new malware instances were detected
(Symantec, 2015). In 2016, CryptoLocker ransomware attacks, which can find and
encrypt files (see page 31 for a more complete definition and explanation of this kind of
cyber-attack), were higher than 2015 and the types of ransomware increased by 752%
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(TrendLabs, 2017). Examining and recording the amount of new malicious code samples
each day is overwhelming.
Attackers with malware targeted the Epsilon system, made their way into the email servers, and obtained the names and e-mails of thousands of clients (Bonner, 2012;
Vijayan, 2011). Attackers accessed Lockheed Martin’s files and stole information
(Schwartz, 2011) and breached Target, JPMorgan, and Home Depot security defenses
(Walters, 2014). Most businesses in the United States continue to fall victim to cyberattacks with DoS. The CNN, Yahoo, and Amazon targeted attack rates were around 1 Gb
per second (Harrison, 2000). In 2013, the DoS attack rate grew to 300 Gb per second
(Kaur, Kumar, & Bhandari, 2017; Yu, 2014). In the fourth quarter of 2014, DoS attacks
increased by 57% compared to 2013 (Brenner, 2015). The 2016 DoS attack brought
down many Internet connections. The magnitude of attack was 1.2 Tbps (York, 2017).
According to the Kaspersky report (2019), the number of DoS attacks mounted by 84%,
with the major growth in the number of attacks lasting over 60 minutes. The average
duration of attacks enlarged by 4.21 times. The size of attacks is larger than ever before.
The conventional information technology security system offers little protection from
cyber-criminals using advanced DoS and malware targeted methods to bypass security
systems.
The sophistication and growth of cyber-security targeted attacks led scholars to
examine the applicability of various cyber-security theories, including prevention, risk
management (Salim, 2014), and general deterrents (Hassan, Reza, & Farkhad, 2015).
These traditional approaches focused on the nature of attack prevention (Whitman &
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Mattord, 2016) and have potential limitations. For cyber-crime, researchers (e.g., Holt &
Bossler, 2014; Leukfeldt, 2014; Holt, 2017) increasingly used Cohen and Felson’s (1979)
routine activity theory (RAT); the theory is traditionally used to highlight crimes in
relation to opportunity and action. Researchers also use rational choice theory (RCT) in
cyber-crime research (e.g., Claude & Siponen, 2014; Exum & Layana, 2016; Homans,
1961; Hostettler, 2011). The theory derived from an economic principle designed by
Cornish and Clarke (1987) and examines attackers’ choices from a risk/benefit
perspective in relation to gains and losses.
Problem Statement
The growth of Internet connectivity across the globe has led to an increase in DoS
targeted attacks (Arora, Kumar, & Sachdeva, 2011; Harris & Maymi, 2016). Since 2000,
in the United States, business sectors were targeted with DoS attacks at an increasing rate
of occurrence and cost (Mahjabin, Xiao, Sun, & Jiang, 2017; Nakashima, 2014). Fighting
cyber-attacks costs organizations over $100 billion annually (Nakashima, 2014), which is
an unsustainable loss. Further, these attacks continue to threaten organizations with
billions of dollars in damages (Singer & Friedman, 2014), also unsustainable.
Although DoS attacks have become the problem of the security of business
sectors, researchers have focused on examining risks and problems of cyber-security
(Andress & Winterfeld, 2014; Mulligan & Schneider, 2011). Understanding that cybersecurity has continued to be an emergent area of study, Warkentin and Willison (2009)
called for the addition of new lenses for criminological studies. Although researchers
examined risks, cyber-security problems, and DoS attacks (Harris & Maymi, 2016;
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Sanghvi & Dahiya, 2013; Sood & Enbody, 2014; Whitman & Mattord, 2016), at the time
of this study, there were no published research papers that specifically addressed the
differences among business sector types and rates, duration, and financial damages of
DoS attacks nor the relationship between company assets and revenues and the duration
of attacks and the financial damages due to attacks. Knowing the patterns among business
sector types, company assets and revenues, and the rates and severity of attacks would
help to address this research gap.
Existing research on the rates and severity of attacks across business sectors (such
as Amoroso, 2011; Mahjabin et al., 2017; Tajalizadehkhoob, Asghari, Ganan, & van
Eeten, 2014) does not focus solely on DoS attacks and has not examined rates and
severity of attacks beyond a 3-year period (Tajalizadehkhoob et al., 2014), making a
DoS-focused study that addresses a longer period especially necessary. Such knowledge
could enable cyber-security professionals to identify targeted sectors and customize their
approaches in cyber-defense. The general problem for businesses and cyber-security
professionals is that the continuation of DoS targeting attacks damages business sector
values financially. The specific problem is that cyber security professions currently
clearly do not know the metrics that determine how attackers collectively target business
sectors with DoS and have been unable to protect business from attacks.
To address this problem, I used quantitative methods to examine the differences
among business sector types in attack rates, duration of attacks, and financial damages
resulting from attacks as well as the relationship among company assets and revenues and
duration of attacks and financial damages. The findings from this study, particularly the
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findings on differences among business sector types in attack rates, duration of attacks,
and financial damages, can provide security professionals with information they need to
more effectively target their attention and spending.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to examine the difference of attack rates, duration
of attacks, and their resulting financial damages among business sectors over a 19-year
period as well as the relationship among company revenues and assets and the duration of
attacks and the relationship among company revenues and assets and the financial
damages from attacks, also over a 19-year period. The results of the statistical analyses
address the research gap and help scholars and cyber-security professionals identify the
most likely targets of attacks, particularly those that are most damaging in terms of
duration and financial loss. This study contributes to knowledge about risk factors for
DoS attacks that could allow cyber security professionals to focus their efforts on
organizations that are most likely to suffer a DoS attack and to provide possible
suggestions for organizations to minimize their attractiveness as targets of DoS attacks.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
The research questions for this study were specific and formulated based upon
reliable theoretical analysis. Designing research questions requires a combination of
practicality and relevancy as the study needs to be testable, suitable for data collection,
and likely to lead to a useful answer (Singleton & Straits, 2017). Newman and Covrig
(2013) stated that research questions must be coherent with the purpose of study and
problem statement. Further, although there is no single best approach to testing a
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hypothesis, the research hypothesis should be measurable, suitable for intended study,
and reflect different aspects (Singleton & Straits, 2017). The first three research questions
(RQs 1, 2, and 3) and hypotheses (e.g., H01: null and Ha1: alternative) for this study deal
with differences in DoS attacks among business sectors:
(RQ1): Between 2000–2019, were there significant differences among business
sectors in the rate of DoS attacks?
(H01): Between 2000–2019, there were no significant differences among business
sectors in the rate of DoS attacks.
(Ha1): Between 2000–2019, there were significant differences among business
sectors in the rate of DoS attacks.
RQ2: Between 2000–2019, were there significant differences among business
sectors in the duration of DoS attacks?
H02: Between 2000–2019, there were no significant differences among business
sectors in the duration of DoS attacks.
Ha2: Between 2000–2019, there were significant differences among business
sectors in the duration of DoS attacks.
RQ3: Between 2000–2019, were there significant differences among business
sectors in the financial damage per DoS attack?
H03: Between 2000–2019, there were no significant differences among business
sectors in the financial damage per DoS attack.
Ha3: Between 2000–2019, there were significant differences among business
sectors in the financial damage per DoS attack.
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The remaining two research questions and hypotheses (e.g., H04: null and Ha4,
Hb4: alternative) for this study deal with the relationship between company assets and
revenues and attack duration and financial damages:
RQ4: Between 2000–2019, within sectors, were there significant relationships
between company assets and/or revenues and duration of DoS attacks?
H04: Between 2000–2019, within sectors, there were no significant relationships
between company assets and/or revenues and the duration of DoS attacks.
Ha4: Between 2000–2019, within sectors, there was a significant relationship
between company assets and the duration of DoS attacks.
Hb4: Between 2000–2019, within sectors, there was a significant relationship
between company revenues and the duration of DoS attacks.
RQ5: Between 2000–2019, within sectors, were there significant relationships
between company assets and/or revenues and the financial damage
resulting from DoS attacks?
H05: Between 2000–2019, within sectors, there were no significant relationships
between company assets and/or revenues and the financial damage of DoS attacks.
Ha5: Between 2000–2019, within sectors, there was a significant relationship
between company assets and the financial damage resulting from DoS attacks.
Hb5: Between 2000–2019, within sectors, there was a significant relationship
between company revenues and the financial damage resulting from DoS attacks.
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Theoretical Framework
A theoretical framework is the incorporation and fusion of thoughts that
researchers distinguish to depict and explain a particular phenomenon (Imenda, 2014). I
used RAT and RCT, and cyber-attack (DoS) theory developed by Yar (2005),
Mandelcorn, Modarres, and Mosle (2013), Tajalizadehkhoob et al. (2014), and Reyns
(2016) as the theoretical framework for this study. These researchers developed a theory
to address the gap, limited depth, and absence of other cyber-attack or DoS attack theory.
Given the similarity between cybercrime or attacks in businesses and social settings, the
theories advanced in the criminology literature are appropriate for cyber-security
research, specifically RAT and RCT.
I used this theoretical framework to examine the research problem in this study.
This framework has been established as effective in cyber-crime research (Exum &
Layana, 2016). Researchers use theoretical frameworks to introduce, depict, and illustrate
the research problem and the significance of the intended practical approach for their
study. In this study I used a combination of RAT designed by Cohen and Felson (1979)
and RCT by Cornish and Clarke (1986), to address my assumption that DoS attackers are
motivated by, and make decisions based on, an evaluation of gains and losses and the
lack of security defenses. As cyber attacks are multifaceted and their sources are unlikely
to be adequately described by a single theory, multiple theories can provide more
effective insight than a single theory. I used RAT and RCT to provide knowledge about
target attractiveness factors, which could help in developing future cyber-security
approaches.
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RAT has traditionally been used to analyze crime based on the premise of an
attractive target and the opportunity for crime; RCT examines the rational decisions that
comprise crime or attacks based on costs and benefits or risks and rewards. Combined,
the use of RAT and RCT allows researchers to examine factors that might influence
attackers’ choices, particularly as they pertain to choosing targets. This section includes a
brief synopsis of why RAT and RCT models are appropriate for analyzing DoS attacks
on targeted companies. A more detailed explanation of the theoretical framework is
provided in Chapter 2.
Routine Activity Theory
The RAT is a branch of crime theory that focuses on the conditions of crimes and
the elements of crimes that occur. Cohen and Felson (1979), who developed RAT, argued
that an attack or crime occurs at the convergence of a motivated attacker and an
appropriate target that is in some way attractive or susceptible. This theory provides a
macroperception of crime. Attacks are neither unintentional nor frivolous actions, and
choosing suitable targets is a rational calculation (Cohen & Felson, 1979). The theory
explains the convergence of motivated attackers with the goal of committing a crime
against the target. The RAT is an appropriate framework for the study to explain cyberattacks. The theory calls for analysis of the specific circumstances for crimes; in the
terms of this study, an attack occurs when a motivated cyber-attacker and targeted
business sector are present. In this study, I used RAT to examine the targeted business
sector types, revenues, and assets, attack rates, durations of attacks and resulting financial
damages.
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RAT is an analytical method suited for use in real-life situations (Hollis, Felson,
& Welsh, 2013). According to the theory, a potential attacker must be motivated to
commit the cyber-crime. The target needs to be the right target from an attacker’s
perspective and lack effective guardianship, making it vulnerable enough to be a potential
target. In practical testing of the theory, scholars indicated that it is a good fit in a variety
of cyber-attacks (Downess, Rock, & McLaughlin, 2016; Felson & Boba, 2010).
Researchers applied the theory to research on cyber-attacks in virtual spaces (Bolden &
Nalla, 2014; Holt & Bosler, 2013; Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016; Ngo & Paternoster, 2011).
RAT is valuable for describing an attacker’s rationale of scanning vulnerable targets to
deny access using DoS. Further, using RAT as a framework provided an understanding of
both suitable targets and lack of security.
Rational Choice Theory
While RAT can be a useful analytical tool for studying the factors that might
predispose companies to a cyber-attack, the focus of RCT is choice and decisions
pertaining to the actual crime (Cornish & Clarke, 1986, 2008). The theory includes an
assumption that attackers premeditate their actions before they decide to commit an
attack and that an attack or crime is purposive, intentional, and for the attacker’s benefit
(Clarke & Cornish, 2001). More specifically, attackers select their targeted sectors to
fulfill financial or social status desires (Cornish & Clarke, 2008). When applying theories
from other disciplines to cyber DoS attacks, it is important to seriously consider the
context to refine the theory for the study setting. As such, I used RCT to study DoS
attacks by focusing on the attacker perspective (attacker and choice of target).
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Three main premises of RCT (agent, choice, and opportunity to take action)
(Cameron & Kornhauser, 2015) were relevant to the current research project because
they address the elements needed for a cyber-attack to occur in the business sector. The
RCT first identifies the agent/attackers; specifically, it defines preferences of an attacker.
Second, it distinguishes the set of choices accessible to the attacker. Third, it detects the
situation in which the attacker acts (Cornish & Clarke, 1986). Further, Vance and
Siponen (2012) expanded the RCT for their theoretical model and described that RCT
can be a good fit for explaining intentional cyber-security crimes and target accessibility.
As a theoretical foundation, RCT can be used to explain targeting patterns in DoS
attack rates, as it helps explain the targeting factors such as business sector types and
values (assets and revenues) in relation to attack rates and duration, and financial
damages of DoS attacks. Theoretically, businesses that are more attractive will
experience higher rates, longer durations and greater losses, providing the ideal
underpinnings for this research. I determined differences among business sectors in attack
rates, duration of attacks, and financial damages resulting from attacks. I also examined
the relationship between company assets and revenues and the duration of attacks as well
as the financial damages resulting from attacks. RAT and RCT was used as the
theoretical foundation for explaining the results in relation to target value attractiveness.
Nature of the Study
This quantitative study involved investigating DoS attacks in the United States
from 2000 to 2019. Research projects fall into three categories: quantitative, qualitative,
or mixed methods (Bryman & Bell, 2015). Quantitative methods measure variables and
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statistically analyze numerical data; qualitative techniques identify and explore meanings
and interpretations about particular phenomena, including human behaviors (Neuman,
2011); and mixed method examine various features of a phenomena (Long, 2014). The
goal of this study is not to explore phenomenon to reveal meanings. Thus, neither a
qualitative nor mixed method approach was appropriate.
Quantitative research applies numerical data to focus on particular research
questions and answer research questions (Neuman, 2011), which was appropriate for this
study, Quantitative descriptive design was applicable for this research in that I used
numerical means to determine statistically significant differences between categorical
variables and answer research questions 1-3. A quantitative correlational design was
applicable to determine the degree of relationship between variables and answer research
questions 4 and 5. This quantitative study was not designed to use control groups, the
manipulation of predicted relationships between variables (Neuman, 2011),
randomization, or manipulation to predict relationships between variables. This
quantitative study is neither an experimental nor a quasi-experimental design; neither of
those approaches were appropriate for this study because it was designed to analyze
numerical, archival data utilizing computational data methods.
Based on Singleton and Straits’ (2017) research approach, I used a systematic
method to gather data on the following five business sectors: educational, financial,
informational, insurance, and retail. I compiled the data for this study from the following
archival databases: Computerworld, McAfee, Privacyrights.org, Idtheftcenter.org,
Avtest.org, IC3, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), U.S. Department of Justice, and
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Department of Homeland Security reports, Department of Commerce, Library of
Congress. Archival documents refer to existing data recorded or reported information that
gives researchers valuable sources of measurement (Singleton & Straits, 2017).
When randomization and manipulation of independent variable is not possible, ex
post facto design is suitable to examine the relationship between the dependent and
independent variables (Ary, Jacobs, & Sorenen, 2010). Ex post facto is a type of
nonexperimental research in which the researcher measures the statistical differences
between variables with no way to control extraneous variables. Employing an ex post
facto research design was necessary for this study because examining DoS attacks in
real time, would have required collecting data over a very long time span in order to
examine enough instances to draw conclusions. I examined differences among business
sectors in attack rates, duration of attacks, and financial damages resulting from attacks,
which required three the Kruskal-Wallis tests with sector as the independent variable and
rate of attacks, duration of attacks, and financial damage resulting from attacks as the
three dependent variables. Correlational research is a type of research in which the
researcher measures the statistical relationship among variables. I examined the
relationship between company assets and revenues and the duration of attacks and the
relationship between company assets and revenues and the financial damages resulting
from attacks, which required four Spearman correlations with assets and revenues as the
independent variables and duration of attacks, and financial damage resulting from
attacks as the three dependent variables. Data was analyzed using Statistical Packages of
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the Social Sciences (SPSS) version 24, which includes Kruskal-Wallis tests and
Spearman correlation analyses.
By examining the difference of attack rates, duration of attacks, and financial
damages resulting from attacks among business sectors over a 19-year period as well as
the relationship among company assets and revenues and the duration of attacks and the
relationship among company assets and revenues and financial damages, the study was
designed to respond to the problem of cyber security professionals not having adequate
metrics to determine how attackers target businesses with DoS attacks. The findings from
this study could enlighten security professionals, contribute to the advancement of cybersecurity theory, and enrich the availability of empirical writings on cyber-security.
Definitions
Thorough knowledge of the terms and acronyms used in cyber-security research
is crucial for understanding the topic. In the field of cyber-security, scholars and
professionals used several terms to define and describe their activities. To sustain
methodological accuracy, this section includes key definitions. The main terms for this
study include the following.
Attack: An attack is a deliberate effort to launch an assault to exploit a weakness
of a company’s defense structure to bring destruction, failure, and disrupt normal traffic
or to make normal network resource unavailable (Stewart et al., 2015).
Asset: An asset is everything of monetary value retained by a business that is
grouped as capital/fixed, current, tangible or intangible and stated in terms of their cash
value on financial accounts (The Farlex Financial Dictionary, 2017).
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Business sectors: For this study, businesses are classified as falling into the
following business sectors: educational, financial, informational, insurance, and retail
sectors (Langager, 2019).
Breach: A breach is an act of breaking the defense system of organizations or
penetrating the system by an attacker (Stewart et al., 2015).
Damage: Damage refers to a negative effect on the asset values by denying
services and it includes both the tangible losses, lost revenue, and other types of damages
(Palekiene, Bruneckiene, & Simanaviciene, 2014). For this study, I used total damages to
a company measured by monetary value caused by DoS online business interruption.
Damage was operationalized as the cost of an individual DoS attack. If there had been
more than one attack on a given company, the duration was recorded as the average of
the attacks on that company.
Denial-of-Service (DoS): A DoS is a malicious attack that denies an access of
network connection of a company, making it inaccessible to its intended operators and
cause the target system to crash, by transmitting a large number of packets from
Internet protocol address (Soltanian & Amiri, 2016).
Distributed Denial-of-Service: Is a sophisticated version of DoS and dangerous
Internet connection attacks with the capability to overwhelm a web server, thereby
decelerating it down and possibly taking it down entirely (Jaafar, Abdullah, & Ismail,
2019).
Duration of DoS attack: Duration refers to the time, in hours and minutes that a
DoS takes the system offline and the total legitimate traffic drop and that can be enough
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to inflict damage at the target site (NSFOCUS, 2017). Duration was operationalized as
the amount of time of an individual DoS attack, during which the system was offline. If
there had been more than one attack on a given company, the duration was recorded as
the average duration of the attacks on that company.
Hacking: Hacking is the “illegal intrusion into a computer system without the
permission of the computer owner or user” (Vacca & Rudolph, 2011, p. 22).
Rate of DoS attacks: Rate was operationalized as the number of attacks on a given
company (Zhenxin, 2014). For the purpose of this study, because it would be nearly
impossible to come up with a credible total number of companies in the retail industry,
the researcher examined the 100 companies (as measured by total workforce) in each of
the five sectors and “rate” refers to the number attacks on each of those 100 companies in
the time period under consideration.
Reconnaissance: Reconnaissance is the act of an unlawful attacker exploring to
obtain as much information about the computer connection for further potential attacks
(Agbogun & Ejiga, 2013).
Revenue: Revenue is the total amount of income that a given company generated
from sale of goods and services during a specific period or the amount, in monetary units,
received during in a given time (Carcello, 2008).
System compromise: Unlawful admittance to the computer structure or stored data
(Stewart et al., 2015).
Vulnerability: A flaw in a computer system that provides easy access to
compromise security system (Harris & Maymi, 2016).
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Assumptions
One of the vital assumptions for this research is the accuracy of the archival data
obtained on DoS attacks from Computerworld, McAfee, Privacyrights.org,
Idtheftcenter.org, Avtest.org, Internet Crime Compliant Center (IC3), FBI, U.S.
Department of Justice, U.S. Department of Homeland Security reports, and business
values. The inquiry dataset for this study included data compiled from published reports
and categorized by year, from 2000 to 2019. The quality of the dataset was dependent on
the precision of coding. To ensure that the data was accurate, I included a quality
management mechanism. Coding error detection techniques were in place to ensure the
reduction of inaccuracies. Privacyrights.org, IC3, and FBI provide data considered by
some researchers to be more precise and reliable than data gained by surveys, under the
assumption that the data collected from business sectors only apply to DoS attacks.
Another assumption, directly related to the theoretical framework of this study is that
DoS attackers identify their targeted business sectors based on business factors.
Scope and Delimitations
The scope of this dissertation study is bounded by DoS attacks within selected
business sectors in the United States over a 19-year period. The data were compiled from
the databases listed above and company websites. I included only the five business
sectors identified as having suffered DoS attacks and examined only external DoS attacks
that directly interrupted networking. To answer the research questions, I compiled a
dataset from archival reports on DoS attacks and company financial assets and values.
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As delimitations denote prearranged constraints to manage data (Sampson et al.,
2014), to be feasible this quantitative study required certain delimitations. The most
important delimitation was that I only examined the 100 organizations in each sector.
This resulted in examination of 500 organizations, 100 that had experienced DoS attacks
and 400 that had not. Within the insurance sector, only two organizations had been
attacked, which excluded this sector from some of the analyses. Because some sectors,
such as retail, include thousands of organizations, many of them very small, it was
impractical to randomly select organizations for inclusion in the study.
A second delimitation was that the study included only five business sectors and
so generalizations could not be extended to other business sectors. Specifically, other
types of malicious code attacks and techniques, such as Cross-site Script, Structural
Query Language injection, phishing, sniffing, spoofing, eavesdropping, Data breach, and
ransomware attacks were beyond the scope of this study. Further, because of the vastness
of the topic, this study included a background paradigm limited to that which is useful to
understanding the research questions. In this study, the potential issues of generalizability
were properly addressed. To ensure generalizability, several facets of measurement error
were isolated and eliminated.
Limitations
Limitations are weak points that a researcher cannot control and inappropriately
influence the result of the study (Yin, 2014). Although this study deals with DoS attacks
for a 19-year period, this does not include unsuccessful attempts at DoS attacks, it only
deals with successful DoS attacks that disrupted systems and caused financial loss.
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Businesses targeted with attempted DOS attacks do not always make their reports
available to the public.
I employed ex post facto research, which is a type of nonexperimental research
in which the researcher studies events that have already happened with no way to
control extraneous variables. The study was also limited to the archival data of the
business sectors with DoS attacks during 2000- 2019 in the United States. Another
possible limitation of the study is that the data sources may not have contained
information about all DoS attacks occurred in the U.S. There is a possibility that an
important variable was missing. A final limitation is that this is an archival study, and so
it looked backward at the relationships between the dependent and independent variables
in the past (2000-2019). The continuing relationships was ultimately needed to be
verified with data obtained from future DoS attacks.
Significance of the Study
While there is a large quantity of literature on cyber-attacks, this research adds to
the literature by filling a gap in network and security management literature with regard
to DoS targeted attacks analysis. The findings from this research are applicable to
researchers, government agencies, and organizations. The study findings include
information valuable to organizations, cyber-security professionals, practitioners, and
researchers about DoS targeted attacks. I determined differences among business sectors
in attack rates, duration of attacks, and financial damages resulting from attacks. I also
examined the relationship between company assets and revenues and the duration of
attacks as well as the relationship between company assets and the financial damages
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resulting from attacks. This information could serve as a reference for industry
practitioners and academic researchers in the field of cyber-security attacks. Addressing a
research gap in a field that lacks a unified theory pertaining to cyber-attacks is useful in
real-world applications. By increasing the specificity of the dependent variables beyond
those used in previous studies, this study provides a clearer picture of attack rates,
duration, and financial loss across business sector types and in relation to company
variables, such as revenues and assets. This increased knowledge is a step toward
successful development of holistic approaches to understand types of sectors likely to be
targeted and to identify specific businesses within sectors that are more likely to be a
victim of financial damages.
The findings from this study can inform business managers, information
technology specialists as well as researchers at large. Studying DoS attacks helps build
knowledge necessary for developing appropriate defense and reducing the risks of
attacks. The study’s significance extends further to expand identifying targeted business
sectors and rates of attack per sector for 19 years. The relatively long time period for this
study was chosen because DoS attacks are somewhat infrequent. With five business
sectors, the 19-year period was necessary in order to have a base of 100 DoS attacks to
examine.
Significance to Theory
The paradigms for this study were RAT and RCT, which are basic theoretical
methods in criminology. These theories provided an appropriate framework for studying
the DoS-targeted business sectors attacks as they can be used to examine factors related

25
to attackers, target attractiveness, and lack of guardians. I used the selected theories for
this study to explain differences among business sectors in attack rates, duration of
attacks, and financial damages resulting from attacks as well as the relationship between
company assets and revenues and the duration of attacks and financial damages resulting
from attacks. I used RAT and RCT to interpret findings concerning target attractiveness
and rates of DoS attacks, duration of the attacks, and the financial damages resulting from
these attacks. Previous RAT and RCT studies often focus on motivation in relation to
gaining money, status, and benefits on targeted attacks. While all RAT and RCT
propositions are essentially hypotheses themselves, only selecting the targeted industries
and companies lends itself to more explicit and better testable hypotheses when employed
in the context of DoS attacks.
While assets and revenues are both standard attractiveness factors, this researcher
also considers whether these factors vary in significance by sector. I expanded the
theories by considering other types of motivations on DoS targeted attacks and
underlining the specificity of RCT and RAT in terms of cyber-security attack artifact in
theory development. A new approach using RAT and RCT expands these theories to
cyber-attacks so others can use them differently in the future.
Significance to Practice
Modern cyber-attackers are patient and remain in the system as long as they can
without being noticed; these attacks differ from traditional crime activities where the
offender would conduct the offense and disappear as soon as possible. In this case, the
contemporary criminals follow procedures that are difficult to understand. The current
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cyber-crime threat is persistent (Harris & Maymi, 2016). Applying theories to the
changing nature of attacks provides practical knowledge.
I advanced practical awareness by investigating the cyber-attacks from the
attacker’s standpoint in relation to target attractiveness. The findings assist a cybersecurity investigator in knowing what kinds of targets are likely to be perceived as
suitable. Others could use these findings to prevent future cyber-crimes. Business leaders
and information security specialists who manage cyber-security risks could use the
findings from this research to identify targeted sector types and improve security
practices. Business owners could utilize findings from this research to devise new
approaches to handling strategic priorities related to DoS attacks building more effective
layered defenses.
Significance to Social Change
This research study is important to various parts of society, particularly to cybersecurity practitioners. The combined theories of RAT and RCT can be used to interpret
findings in relation to targeted business sectors. This knowledge can assist cyber-security
practitioners in reducing cyber-criminal activities, increasing company defense system
control measures, and minimizing the likelihood of a cyber-attack happening. The
information and knowledge obtained as an outcome of this research could improve
information systems management’s understanding of the risk of attack for targeted
business sectors and holds the potential for positive social change through decreasing
DoS attacks. This study is useful for security professionals to gain knowledge that could
help them build their security defenses and reduce the likelihood of attacks.
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Summary
DoS attacks are more complicated and threatening than previously thought. These
attacks will increase in speed, diffusion, and power if action does not take place. The
dynamism of these attacks continues to be the biggest threat to cyber-security in business,
as it is almost impossible to know how to design an effective defense. Even though
researchers studied DoS attacks incidents for years, no clear-cut solution has appeared.
Researchers and organizational leaders attempted to find ways to protect
companies’ cyber-infrastructure from DoS attacks. However, no line of defense emerged
as entirely effective. It is important to understand differences among business sectors in
attack rates, duration of attacks, and financial damages resulting from attacks as well as
the relationship between company assets and revenues and the duration of attacks and the
relationship between company assets and revenues and the financial damages resulting
from attacks.
This chapter included a review of the threats posed by DoS attacks and several
challenges faced by academics and cyber-security professionals looking to understand
and mitigate these attacks. The chapter also included the research questions. Chapter 2
will include a comprehensive review of the literature surrounding DoS attacks and the
theoretical frames. Chapter 3 will include the research design, data collection method,
and strategy for data analysis. Chapter 4 will include the results of the analysis of DoS
attacks and an interpretation of the statistical findings. Chapter 5 will include the
rationale of this study and the interpretation of the outcomes. This final chapter will also
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include implications for social change based on the study of DoS attacks in cybersecurity and recommendations for future study.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
My goal for this literature review is to describe the existing research on targeted
business sector attacks with DoS. This review includes a comparison of the findings from
previous DoS attack literature (including attackers) with specific attention to types of
attacks, financial damages, and theoretical foundations. This chapter includes a
discussion of DoS attacks and cyber-security in order to demonstrate a need for the
current study and to show a connection to the problem statement and purpose presented
in Chapter 1.
This review includes literature on business sector cyber-security attacks with DoS
and background information on attacks, attackers, the attacking process, and cybersecurity in general. I also include an outline of existing research on targeted attacks, the
motivation of attacks, target attractiveness, targeted business sectors, and financial
damages. Finally, I describe existing attack metrics. In this review, I explore all these
components in terms of potential DoS attacks in targeting business sectors’ values. A
number of related topics about denial of service and data breach attacks are included.
These topics contained network, computer, and vulnerability attacks and the nature of
DoS and their attack systems. Pertinent literature on DoS, including categories,
techniques, types, targets, and tools of attacks are reviewed and synthesized. I assess and
compare the similarities and differences of researchers’ approaches and offer an extended
review of the two theoretical frames of this study: RAT and RCT. This subsection of the
chapter includes information about the background of these theories, their key premises,
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and their application to both cyber-crime and this study in particular. Finally, this chapter
includes highlights of the benefit of using these theories in combination.
As researchers conduct literature reviews “to identify theories, and findings [and]
gaps in knowledge in that research area” (Bhattacherjee, 2012, p. 21), this chapter
includes a systematic investigation of theories, findings, and gaps in the literature on DoS
attacks based on an evaluation of ideas promoted by Singleton and Straits (2017). These
authors recommended using logic to review literature related to a research problem, the
purpose of a study, and the research questions and to explore and analyze basic account
information. The literature review also includes recent scholarly works that include the
theoretical and methodological input.
As cyber-security has become a new field of study, finding theoretically and
empirically advanced, well-researched, and unified literature on this research topic is
challenging. The focus is on academic and peer-reviewed articles from various sources,
with attention to taxonomies of DoS attacks. The theoretical background for this
literature review includes recent literature pertinent to cyber-security attacks. I used the
Library of Congress (books, peer-reviewed articles, journals, newspapers), local
university libraries, and computerized databases and resources, such as EBSCO,
ProQuest Dissertations, and the Google search engine to find applicable materials on the
topic of DoS attacks. Key search terms were used cyber-attack, DoS, data breach,
information systems attacks, network security attacks, security incidents, routine activity
theory, rational choice theory attackers, and targeted business sector.
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Cyber-Attacks
The developers of RAT), Cohen and Felson (1979), stated that attacks occur when
there is an attacker and a target in the absence of security. But one question that arises
when conducting research on targeting business sectors with DoS attacks is what an
attack or cyber-attack entails. In general, a cyber-attack is an assault launched from a single
computer or multiple computer systems against another computer system\ to disrupt
communications or to gain data. In 2009, analysts at the National Research Council
presented a description of attacks as “deliberate actions to alter, disrupt, deceive, degrade,
or destroy computer systems or networks or the information and/or programs resident in
or transiting these systems or networks” (p. 1). Kesan and Hayes (2012) attempted to
offer insight into the legal issues related to attacks and found that researchers felt uneasy
about expressing the differences between cyber-attacks, cyber-exploitation, or cyberintrusion. Hathaway et al. (2012) defined a cyber-attack with DoS as an attack that
encompasses any engagement to destabilize the operation of a communication system for
a government or public protection principle. According to Uma and Padmavathi (2013), a
cyber-attack is any technique used to disrupt the Internet communication or structure.
Uma and Padmavathi’s understanding of an attack included the breakdown of a computer
defense network structure.
From a more technical point of view, Conrad et al. (2015) referred to an attack as
an intentional act against computer components or a computer system that aims to
destroy, deny access to, or degrade the system. An attack with DoS is a deliberate attempt
to manipulate computer systems and networks (making these attacks well-suited to
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analysis using the RCT and the result of the action may be cyber-crimes. Harris and
Maymi (2016) focused on process when describing an attack as the deliberate act of
tracking someone’s movements without his or her authorization or knowledge that leads
to a breach in the information system. The skills and technology employed in executing
attacks are similar to those used in cyber-exploitation, yet the objectives of each action
are different. Attacks result in dysfunction, as attackers try to render the computer system
and networks untrustworthy and unavailable.
Attacks with DoS are asymmetric, stealthy, and evolving; an individual, group, or
state located anywhere on the globe can deny access to, or breach, the computer system.
According to Clarke and Knake (2010), attacks exist in a global system, and they can
occur quickly at any time. Clarke and Knake stressed the ability of an attack to obliterate
private and government computer infrastructures by providing examples of attack
scenarios triggered by DoS. Although Clarke and Knake made some important points, it
is difficult to confirm the credibility of their assertions or to know the source of an attack.
The explanation for attacks is inadequate for real-world applications. Despite these
limitations, scholars make similar arguments, including that no private or government
cyber-infrastructure has protection from multifaceted attacks in the electronic era (Yu,
2014). Part of the complication of protecting against attacks can be tied to questions of
responsibility. Sales (2013) noted that researchers had not sufficiently tackled the issue of
cyber-security because “most scholars understand cyber-attacks as a problem of either the
criminal law or the law of armed conflict” (p. 1503). The focus of most research is on
attack behavior rather than the metrics and mechanism of cyber-attack target choices. An
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attack can be separated into two forms or categories: an attack in which the aim is to impede
the target computers or one in which the aim is to breach the systems to get information from
the computer.
Type of Attacks
To understand how attackers target companies with DoS, it is necessary to
classify the various types of attacks. Attacks on the cyber-security systems of
organizations can take many different forms. This study involved examining DoS attacks,
which form most attacks against businesses. To find a solution to computer and network
insecurity, scholars proposed taxonomy systems for attacks.
Hansman and Hunt (2005) developed a taxonomy comprised of four computer
attack dimensions. The first dimension deals with the attack vector or the path by which
malicious code gets to its targets. The second dimension, attack target, indicates whether
the attack is aimed at hardware or software targets. The third dimension consists of the
type of vulnerability that attackers exploit. The final dimension is the attack payload,
which refers to the risk or effect associated with the attack. Chabinsky (2010) examined
the attack vector on its own and classified attacks into supply chain, remote access, and
proximity access based on the type of access that the attackers use to gain unauthorized
entry into a system or network.
Kjaerland (2005) classified attacks based on incident reports. The first category is
the attack’s source area, such as .com or .gov (Kjaerland, 2005). The second category is
the techniques of the attack, such as a virus or DoS (Kjaerland, 2005). The third category
is the impact that the attack has on the system, and the fourth is the services targeted by
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the attack (Kjaerland, 2005). Harris and Maymi (2016) suggested adding Domain Name
System cache poisoning to the list of the types of cyber-attacks because that type of
attack interrupts a service and damages systems.
Researchers attempted to classify DoS security attacks on companies more
precisely, including bandwidth flooding attacks, penetration attacks, cyber-infrastructure
attacks, and electronic warfare attacks (Conrad et al., 2015; Harris & Maymi, 2016).
Somal and Virk (2014) examined the history, trends, and strategies of a wide range of
DoS attacks across and categorized these attacks by level of mechanization, the assault
pace, and the attack impact. The study highlighted how DoS attacks became a complex
and serious problem for businesses and identified various approaches proposed to counter
them. Harris and Maymi (2016) and Conrad et al. (2015) also addressed the attacks that
come from DoS, virus, and worm attacks. Because researchers do not use one common
taxonomy to address business sector attacks, this study included the models that Harris
and Maymi (2016) and Conrad et al. (2015) used to classify the different types of DoS
attacks and other types of cyber attacks.
Malware Attacks
Like a DoS attack, a malware attack is a type of cyber-security attack against a
company’s values. Malicious software attacks involve attempts to identify targets’
components and infect their systems. Both Harris and Maymi (2016) and Conrad et al.
(2015) described malware as a generic term that comprises all types of harmful software,
including computer viruses, worms, Trojan horses, spyware, logic bombs, key loggers,
shareware, backdoors, botnet code, and root kits. Attackers can use various types of
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malware viruses and worms to manage a system (Conrad et al., 2015; Harris & Maymi,
2016). The malware works by affecting the integrity of stored data or information, as well
as the entire system (Conrad et al., 2015; Harris & Maymi, 2016). Malware attackers put
destructive software into use to conduct activities that can harm electronic
communication.
Unlike a DoS attack, malware resources can customize content delivery to a
victim. The complexity of malware is increasing, and it can often access its target system
without detection to gather information. According to Rajab, Zarfoss, Monrose, and
Terzis (2006) and Pinguelo and Muller (2011), malware programs gather personal data,
store and distribute illegal content, and attack computer and network systems. Beyond
personal computers, malware programs can also attack and cripple infrastructures.
Cryptolocker
Cryptolocker is one of the most popular types of ransomware that launches
attacks on business computer systems via spam messages, drive-by downloads, watering
hole, and spear phishing (Jarvis, 2014; Stewart et al., 2015). Spammed messages come
with attachments, which contain Cryptolocker malware. The malware installs into the
computer through downloading the file attachments (Pathak, 2016). Upon launching an
attack on a computer, every file and document in the infected computer becomes
encrypted, blocking the normal user access. This is followed up with a message pop-up,
detailing potential damage to the documents and files; the rightful computer owner has to
pay a ransom in order to be issued the decryption key (Thakkar, 2014). Patil (2017)
acknowledged that Cryptolocker, an active Trojan horse, was the initial cyber-attack that
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used public-key encryption. According to Kansagra, Kumhar, and Jha (2016),
Cryptolocker functions by integrating RSA-2048 and AES-256 encryption to lock files
and documents of victims. The use of RSA-2048 encryption makes it a difficult for
rightful computer users to obtain the RSA-2048 key as it takes approximately 6.4
quadrillion years to crack the key.
Cryptolocker attackers lock files and documents rather than focusing on system
destruction. After inhibiting file access, the criminals then demand the users to pay a sum
of money; failure to pay results in obliteration of the encryption key to permanently erase
the user’s data (Stewart et al., 2015). According to Patil (2017), the cyber-attackers
withhold the decryption keys as they demand sum of money to be paid via MoneyPak or
Bitcoin within the time limit, after which they assert to destroy the decryption keys.
Pathak (2016) explained that Cryptolocker attackers, as other cyber-criminals, mainly
target business organizations by launching attacks through spam e-mails. These e-mails
are often sent as complaints by customers. Cryptolocker inhibits users from accessing the
computer system unlike DoS, which blocks the networking system of the users. In the
wake of increasing cyber-security threats, the business community is at risk of losing data
that are the backbone of everyday business operations and organizational success. As
such, information system specialists face the challenge of developing decryption keys to
the encryption algorithm used by malwares such as Cryptolocker.
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Denial-of-Services/Distributed Denial-of-Services Attack
DoS attacks are one kind of cyber-security attack used against business sectors.
For several years, DoS attacks did not receive attention. However, the trend changed in
2011 as attackers began using DoS as one of their main attack methods (Kesan & Hayes,
2012; Patil & Kulkarni, 2011). By 2012, DoS attacks became a part of the cyber-security
landscape. In 2017, 6.9 million attacks by DoS, which were not at all selective and cut
across all sectors, were registered; in October of that year 22,622 attacks were registered
per day (Whalen, 2017). The present study dealt only with the tiny fraction of those
attempts that actually resulted in denial of service.
DoS attack operations have several vectors and often occur over an extended
period. Their advanced and multifarious nature has produced security challenges for
companies. Attackers use various methods to attack and gain control of computers.
Traditional security devices such as firewalls, IDSs, and antivirus software programs are
not effective in defending against DoS attacks that forward extra traffic to a network
address (Harris & Maymi, 2016).
Harris and Maymi (2016) addressed some similarities and differences between
DoS and DDoS. Whereas a DoS attack involves using a single computer and an Internet
link to flood a server with packets, a DDoS attack involves using multiple computers and
Internet connections, which makes it more difficult to deflect. Harris and Maymi noted
that DDoS attacks send voluminous packets in large numbers to consume a larger part of
the network’s bandwidth. DoS attacks do not depend on an Internet protocol. The most
widespread type of DoS attack is the packet flooding attack. Flooding attacks consume
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the target resources by flooding the system with an overwhelming number of packets
(Harris & Maymi, 2016). Arora et al. (2011) and Conrad et al. (2015) indicated that the
common goal of DoS attacks is to use up the target system’s availability to legitimate
users. The danger of DoS attacks is higher in a DDoS attack because DDoS attacks
include massive botnets (Imperva, 2012).
DoS attacks against companies’ systems have become more complex. Anstee
(2013) described escalating attacks over the years. These attacks occur at a speed greater
than 10 and 20 gigabytes per second (Gbps), and they take place numerous times each
day. Schwartz’s (2013) description of the growth of DoS attacks aligned with Anstee’s
description: the average speed of attacks has increased from 6 Gbps to 48 Gbps, and 10%
of all DoS attacks exceed 60 Gbps. The growth in number and severity of DoS attacks
may result in financial damage to companies. Usually, DoS attackers focus on sending a
flood of packets rather than breaching the privacy and integrity of the data (Kashyap &
Jena, 2012).
Even though researchers agreed that DoS attacks involve the interruption of
servers, they examined the nature of DoS in various ways. Mahjabin et al. (2017)
discussed the different forms, strategies, and processes of DoS and examined
architectures used in attacks, but it was Patel and Borisagar (2012) who designed the DoS
taxonomy. Conrad et al. (2015) and Harris and Maymi (2016) reviewed functional
mechanisms of DoS attacks. In a larger context, Yu (2014) provided an understanding of
the emerging issues in the field of DoS attacks and information relating to how DoS
attackers accomplish their mission.
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Smurf Attack
The smurf attack is one common type of DoS attack against companies’ network
systems. Smurf attacks can prevent legitimate traffic by creating an overwhelming
number of pings and resulting echoes directed toward the victim’s IP address. According
to Conrad et al. (2015), to perform a smurf attack, an attacker pings a directed broadcast
address on the Internet with the address forged as being from the victim. The computer
then becomes unresponsive due to the creation of high computer network traffic on the
victim’s network. Smurf attacks flood the target with Internet control message protocol
(ICMP) echo packets. The spoofed network packet sent from the smurf program includes
an ICMP ping. There are similarities between Harris and Maymi’s (2016) and Conrad et
al. (2015)’s research on the nature of smurf attacks. However, Harris and Maymi added
the attacker, the victim, and the amplifying network to their research.
Fraggle Attack
Like the smurf attack, the fraggle attack is a type of flooding attack. Attackers of
both types of attacks send packets to a network amplifier. However, fraggle attacks use
user datagram protocol (UDP) echo packets instead of the ICMP echo used by the smurf
attack (Conrad et al., 2015; Harris & Maymi, 2016). A fraggle attack is a DoS attack that
works when attackers broadcast a spoofed UDP packet to the amplifying network, which
responds by replying to the victim’s system (Harris & Maymi, 2016).
SYN Flood Attack
Like smurf and fraggle attacks, synchronization (SYN) attacks involve flooding.
A SYN flood attack depletes protocol data construction on the server side by sending a
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constant stream of requests to the transfer control protocol (TCP) link from external
hosts. In this manner, the servers must match resources to every new connection, thereby
using all of its resources (Conrad et al., 2015). A SYN flooding attack involves
constantly sending packets to each port on the server using a bogus IP address to exhaust
the connection resources. In this situation, a hostile user may exploit a half-open
connection and gain access to the target’s server. Smurf, fraggle, and SYN flood attacks
involve attempts to disable the target networks. In these attacks, the server loses or cannot
process a real connection.
The Ping-of-Death Attack
The ping of death involves sending a malformed ping to a computer with an intent
to attack the destination host server. Conrad et al. (2015) and Harris and Maymi (2016)
provided similar descriptions of the nature of the ping-of-death attack. A typical server
attack involves the flooding of ping traffic on a single server in such a way that the
regular traffic fails to reach the target computer system (Conrad et al., 2015; Harris &
Maymi, 2016). According to Stewart et al. (2015), sending a ping larger than the TCP/IP
requirement packet size (65,535) could crush the destination server. The ICMP echo
requests of a packet size greater than the standard IP packet size cripple the victim’s
server, and the victim cannot reassemble the packets. The ping-of-death attack is easy to
implement using the ping application packaged with any operating system.
The Teardrop Attack
Teardrop attacks generally involve manipulating fragmented IP packages.
According to Conrad et al. (2015) and Harris and Maymi (2016), teardrop attacks usually
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exploit the overlapping fragment bug on computers with operating systems such as
Windows NT and Windows 95. The bug causes the IP fragmentation assembly code to
malfunction by failing to coordinate the overlapping IP fragments. Severe damage can
occur because computer users fail to save their data in open applications. Teardrop
attacks can crash the systems and there is a chance of losing unsaved data on the affected
computer.
Launching DDoS Attacks
The complexity of attacks and the volume of traffic necessary to block and
control a target system increased. The Mariposa and Kroxxu botnets are just two of the
many hundreds of similar botnets, and the scale of similar botnets can run to 10s of
millions of hosts. The Mariposa botnet, for instance, infected over 13 million computers
(McMillan, 2010). In 2016, a massive flooded DoS attack occurred. A domain name
service business was flooded by 1.2 Tbps of traffic, the most massive of DoS traffic ever
documented (McAfee, 2017).
Alomari, Manickam, Gupta, Karuppayah, and Alfaris (2012) and Yu (2014)
explained forms and launching techniques of DDoS attacks. The bandwidth depletion
attack involves sending harmful traffic to a target’s system to prevent the target from
accessing the legal traffic. This type of attack can be categorized into amplification and
flood attacks. Further, according to Malik (2016), the amplification assault includes
sending the message to a broadcast IP address to cause harmful traffic resulting from
messages being sent via broadcast in the target’s system. As the harmful traffic increases,
the target’s bandwidth becomes low. The attackers send large floods of traffic to the
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target’s system bandwidth using robots (zombies) to cause congestion in the network and
with the traffic of the IP. Because the bandwidth is saturated, the target’s network
becomes slow or crashes. Amplification attack is associated with an attacker or zombies
sending packets to scattered IP addresses. These attacks cause all network systems on the
subnet to be accessible by the multiple user IP locations to access packets to the target’s
network. Somal and Virk (2014) stated that the flooding attack increases unwanted
network traffic that leads to a reduction in the victim system’s bandwidth. User datagram
protocol (UDP) and Internet control message protocol (ICMP) packets are used to launch
this type of attack. In the UDP method of flood attack, a large number of packets are
randomly sent to the target’s network, and the system tries to respond to the packets as
incoming requests. If the target’s system is not running any applications on the port, a
message of the port not being reachable is sent by ICMP packet.
Alomari et al. (2012) and Malik (2016) described that a resource attack is
achieved through limiting the user’s requirements to access the network. This type of
attack is aimed at the core of a network where all processes are done. An attacker sends
messages that include the guiding communications in a network. Requirements for usage
in the network are shut down. In attacks in TCP SYN, the initiator of the attack is the one
who sends instructions and directions to the user’s system so that the requests by the user
are not responded to. IP address packets consist of similar message sources and
destinations of the recipient addresses. This type of attack leads to confusion in the
victim’s system, which can result in the system crashing.

43
DoS crushes the targeted system by sending packets to the system of the victim.
DoS attacks are performed by using large volumes of traffic to deplete the bandwidth,
OS, and computing power of victim systems. The quality of the victim system is
degraded, which prevents legitimate clients from being able to access the system. The
depletion attack is hard to control or manage compared to the bandwidth attack.
In order to launch DoS attacks, attackers need to set up attack network connection
systems with compromised systems. To set up an attack network, DoS attackers use
scanning tools to search unprotected computer systems or hosts on the Internet. Alomari
et al. (2012), Yu (2014), and Stewart et al. (2015) explained how DoS attackers set up
botnets (robot networks) to coordinate launching from botnets in compromised systems.
The attacker launches bots, which are small scripts for performing automated functions to
secondary targets that send other entities to the primary target. Before organizing a
botnet, attackers access the potential targets using the Internet and run scripts to get into
the compromised systems. The attackers then install harmful software to the target’s
computer using a virus, worm, attachments, and other methods. After installing the
harmful software into compromised systems, the attacker uses the weakness of various
layers of the network (i.e., SYN, UDP, and ICMP flooding) to make the system a
secondary victim and use it as a robot in accessing the primary targets. The command and
control server act as the headquarters of a botnet by communicating with the bots to
update the attack order and tools. The control servers are set by the programmers to have
intermediate nodes between them and the bots to maintain them. The messages in the
communication of the control server and the bots are encrypted to encroach on the
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network bandwidth and resources of the target, hence facilitating denial of legitimate
access by clients to the servers hence no service.
A large volume of botnets will shut down the targeted systems. To make sure that
all bots get into contact with their various call command and control servers, the relevant
IP addresses of the central command centers must keep changing to prevent trace and
detection for elimination. To remain undetected, attackers separate botnet activities to
prevent them from being removed or detected. Techniques such as reflectors, IP tricking,
code confusion, and memeory coding are used by attackers to make sure their bots
survive. The masters or owners of botnets avoid detection and elimination by changing
servers and IP of command and control while still maintaining the communication
between the bots and the command and control servers (Yu, 2014).
Commonly Used Attack Tools
Attackers use common tools to perform DoS attacks. Radware (2013) provided
information about attack tools used by attackers. Attackers use some of these tools to
launch application layer, volume-based, and protocol DoS attacks.
Trinoo
Tripathi, Gupta, Almomani, Mishra, and Veluru (2013) referred to several
resources that described how attackers use Trinoo to accomplish flooding attacks against
a combination of several IP addresses. Trinoo commands the master and agent computers
to send DoS flooding (see Figure 1). In such a scenario, DoS attackers use sizeable UDP
packets to manipulate some ports on victims’ computers, and attackers are able to access
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information by using application vulnerabilities on the victims’ computers (Radware,
2013).
Tribe Flood Network Tool
Behal and Kumar (2017) described the Tribe Flood Network (TFN) tool, which
consists of a combination of computer programs that attackers use to execute smurf
attacks, UDP floods, and ICMP floods. This set of computer programs uses master–slave
architecture to manipulate random ports at the victims’ computers. To execute a TFN
attack, the TFN master station sends a command package to several TFN servers. On
command, the sent signals generate a predefined DoS attack against the target systems
(see Figure 1). Attackers can both randomize the source ports and hide the source IP
address to make the DoS attack more widespread. To avoid detection, attackers vary the
sizes of packets by using packet crafting tools like Loki to communicate to the master
servers. The ICMP echo reply packets play a role in controlling TFN agents from a
remote location.

Figure 1. Master slave botnet attacks.
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Somal and Virk (2014) indicated that the TFN 2000 has various techniques for
overflowing in conjunction with other exploits to carry out DoS attacks. Hoque, Bhuyan,
Baishya, Bhattacharyya, and Kalita (2014) described how the tool could operate in
distributed mode by connecting various computer systems to the Internet for an attack on
a single computer system. Due to its distributed mode of operation, the tool comprises
two modules including a server and a client module. The user of the program must supply
a password to initiate and terminate a TFN 2000 attack. Communication between the
servers and the clients involves using ICMP echo reply packets. As a result, network
users find it hard to detect the attack due to the absence of port numbers.
Stacheldraht Tool
In addition to the TFN tool, Behal and Kumar (2017) examined the Stacheldraht
tool. Stacheldraht consists of a set of computer programs initially designed by Solaris and
Lixus. This set of programs plays the role of a DoS agent. The DoS agent combines some
elements of Trinoo with TFN. Stacheldraht can add some encryption between the
attackers and the master. The tool can also add updates of the agent code to enhance the
efficiency of attacks on the victim’s computer systems. This tool enables source address
IP spoofing and renewals (Radware, 2013). Stacheldraht executes several DoS attacks,
including smurf attacks, UDP floods, TCP SYN floods, and ICMP floods. Stacheldraht
can also use TCP to communicate between the master systems and the agents.
Shaft
Another advanced tool for DoS attack is Shaft. Shaft belongs in the same category
as Trinoo and Stacheldraht. Behal and Kumar (2017) noted that the Shaft tool brings back
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statistical information from agent to handler. Its DoS attack involves collecting statistical
information from the victim machine (Radware, 2013). The tool has some additional
elements, such as the capability to turn on master servers and master ports on the fly.
Shaft consists of one or more shaft masters and several sets of shaft agents. The attacker
uses the client to interact with the handlers. To achieve communication between handlers
and agents, the attacker uses the unreliable IP protocol UDP. Switching master servers
and master ports disrupts detection. Tenet connections from the attacker to the master
provide better conditions for remote control. Attackers can incorporate passwords and
tickets in the command codes to the agents (Dietrich, Long, & Dittrich, 2000).
Mstream
According to Hoque et al. (2014), Mstream acts as a classic point-to-point DoS
attack tool. This program can affect users connected to a network with several agents.
Attackers can use a password-protected interactive login to control the master servers
remotely. Attackers can conceal their identity by setting up the program on both handler
and agent systems. The Mstream tool also spoofs the source IP addresses and randomizes
the client ports. The communication process occurs in TCP and UDP packets, which
makes it hard to encrypt.
Trinity
Behal and Kumar (2017), Mohiuddin, Uddin, and Someswar (2014) described
Trinity as a more sophisticated DoS tool for flooding attacks (UDP, TCP, IP fragment
used to initiate a massive IP flood against several victims’ computer systems). Trinity
operates the same way as other DoS tools, such as TFN and Trinoo. Alomari et al. (2012)
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claimed that Trinity has become one of the advanced Internet relay chat (IRC)-based DoS
tools. Attackers can secretly control the hacked servers from a remote location with the
help of the IRC channel. The chat feature hides the identity of the attacker and makes the
attacker’s operations undetected.
Attackers
Although the term hacker refers to all individuals and groups engaged in cyberattacks with malicious code that target companies, categorizing all cyber-security
attackers into a single group creates conceptual problems. Several investigators noted that
hackers are not a homogeneous class (Harris & Maymi, 2016; Prasad, 2014). Calling a
cyber-attacker a hacker can lead to confusion, vagueness, and misconceptions. Early in
the conceptualization of cyber-attackers, Rogers (2001) noted that researchers should
name groups of attackers for research to take place. Harris and Maymi (2016) claimed
that subgroups of hackers join groups depending on what they want to achieve in their
hacking attempts. Different types of attackers, including script kiddies, crackers, and
hackers, can assault and target the values of companies. All three types of attackers are
skillful in system identification, and engaging in such activities is illegal, as they obtain
access to systems without the owners’ knowledge (Harris & Maymi, 2016). Different
groups of attackers might also end up attacking a single cyber-site or system at the same
time but for different reasons.
Script Kiddies
In examining the script kiddies or attackers who focus on cyber-intrusions without
destroying data or gaining system knowledge, Harris and Maymi (2016) explained that
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this group is unsophisticated and unskillful in hacking, as they do not follow the normal
guidelines for cyber-security attack activity. Professional hacking entails having
knowledge, being skillful, and having the mindset of learning more about the system
while pursuing the act of attacking. However, script kiddies are impatient in their use of
malicious code. Their actions are quick, and they take many shortcuts, which results in
superficial hacking. Conrad et al. (2015) claimed that script kiddies use the hacking
guidelines established by professional hackers to launch their cyber-attacks; they do not
establish their own. As much as script kiddies lack experience and are unknowledgeable,
the damage they cause to a computer system is just as serious as the damage caused by
other attackers. Rittinghouse and Hancock (2003) noted this group’s tendency to use
programs written by professional hackers to do their work. Script kiddies copy and paste
codes used by others to gain access to systems (Lemos, 2000). Members of this group do
not have their own ideas about breaching companies’ security systems. They engage in
cyber-attacks to show that they can do it successfully.
Crackers
Crackers are cyber-security attackers who target companies with DoS and
malware. The attackers in this group obtain access to a company’s computer system
illegally with the motive to destroy, steal from, and introduce viruses into the system.
Crackers target credit cards, files, and the computer systems to corrupt them (Harris &
Maymi, 2016). People confused the terms cracker and hacker, as both groups of attackers
use some of the same skills to access a computer system and cause destruction (Conrad et
al., 2015). Raymond (1996) supported the idea of applying the term cracker to everyone
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who engages in computer attacks illegally. In referring to the computer breaching
criminal activity of crackers, Clifford (2011) noted that crackers only gain access to a
system to cause malicious destruction of the system.
Hackers
Hackers use various methods to block cyber-security systems with DoS.
According to Moore (2015), the terms script kiddies and crackers made it more
complicated to understand the term hacker. The term hacker has lost a lot of its original
meaning, which used to refer to someone knowledgeable about computer efficiency,
creativity, and compact computer programming (Levy, 1984). Schell and Melnychuk
(2011) noted that this positive meaning has been diluted because the hackers under the
first definition enjoyed cognitive challenges. An association used to exist between
hackers and the satisfaction they derived from exploring and overcoming intellectual
barriers. Hackers need to show their skills as they go about gaining illegal access to
computer systems. Harris and Maymi (2016) also tried to clarify this term and discovered
that it fits into two categories of expert programmers: the black hats or illegal hackers and
the white hats, or those associated with attacking a computer system in a planned manner.
Researchers in the field of cultural studies described the category of hackers.
According to Wark (2004), early hackers created a class that was similar to the
capitalists’ class. The relevance of class analysis has withstood the test of dispute posited
by Fuchs (2010), where most of the world’s population depends on some type of wage
earning activity to survive. Conversely, by examining the hacker culture, Coleman (2013)
noted that hackers felt motivated by several driving forces. Most of their motives reflect a
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commitment to “productive freedom” (p. 3) or to libertarian ideas. Kelty (2008) noted
hackers’ ability to overturn preexisting concepts and established modes of representation.
Hackers use various methods to flood the target network with information and breach
security systems. To accomplish that feat, hackers commonly use clocking software to
control logs, logger files, and stamps.
Script kiddies, crackers, and hackers are all cyber-security attackers who use
malicious code, and they attack the same network or computer systems. To avoid
confusion, just as Stewart et al. (2011) did, the researcher used the term attackers in this
study to refer to the following three existing categories: script kiddies, crackers, and
hackers. Members of these subgroups all use the same means to illegally block
communication, gain access to a system, and preserve their access.
Attacking Process
Business sector attackers use techniques to reach their targets to perform DoS
attacks. Harris and Maymi (2016) and Conrad et al. (2015) portrayed cyber-security
attack phases to reach company values in various ways. Skoudis and Zeltser (2006) also
categorized attack techniques. The stages of the cyber-security attacks with DoS often
involve reconnaissance, scanning, and enumeration, in which the attackers try to seek as
much information about the target’s system as possible. They search for this information
using web browsers, employing tools to send packets to spot hosts, and detecting services
run on the target computer of the company. The attackers’ next step is to gain access to
the system. The final phase is to gain control of the machine to plunder information.
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Reconnaissance
The initial phase of cyber-security attacking is reconnaissance. In an analogy to a
traditional criminal attack, this stage is similar to walking into a crime site through the
DNS tables and using nlookup to conduct domain zone transfers (Sanghvi & Dahiya,
2013). Liu and Cheng (2009) described manipulations of the host system’s domain to
gain Internet-accessible names. Disguised as common users, attackers search for domain
names to look for information concerning the target network. These reconnaissance
techniques provide preliminary information about the target structure to break into the
system infrastructure. Reconnaissance includes intent reaching, social engineering,
location mapping of systems, dumpster diving, domain name management, querying who
is, and eavesdropping.
Researchers often described DoS attacks against companies using analogies
similar to traditional crime methods (Sanghvi & Dahiya, 2013) because the attack
procedure follows an organized process. Wiles, Gudaitis, Jabbusch, Rogers, and Lowther
(2012) explained how advanced attackers have become in their approach, using
sophisticated but unexpected methods to obtain access to victims’ information systems.
Sanghvi and Dahiya (2013) noted that active reconnaissance and passive reconnaissance
are common in modern methods of attack. In active reconnaissance, the idea is to target
the IP address, packet route, and ports using different technologies, including ping, trace
route, and netcat. In contrast, the aim of passive reconnaissance is to intrude systems
without the victim noticing the entry due to minimal correspondence with the target. The
intention of passive reconnaissance is to avoid all forms of observation or traces of print,
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and another term for the method is footprinting (Harris & Maymi, 2016). In the process
of reconnaissance, attackers also try to gain general information about the organization in
question. Attackers access the companies’ profile for scanning the target security.
Attackers use accumulated data for targeting an organization’s security to reveal system
vulnerability.
Scanning
After reconnaissance phases, attackers can use automated apparatuses to scan
nodes and find open and active ports of the target. The scanning phase is a logical
expansion of the active reconnaissance. By scanning, attackers can determine which
services are operating on the chosen node. During this process, attackers can find targeted
organizational firewalls, intrusion detections systems, routing, and networking typology.
The scanning phase also includes war driving, ping sweeps, and war dialing to discover
the system connections (Stewart, 2011).
Attackers developed remote attacks using DoS to target businesses. Harris and
Maymi (2016) described remote hacking tools and the techniques that attackers use. As
knowledge of the port used by a target is important in the success rate of an attack on a
system, attackers employ strategies to scan targets’ ports. Using these strategies, it
becomes possible to connect to the target’s system or port, such as port 21 (FTP) or port
80 (HTTP). Port scanning and operating system fingerprinting are two means of gaining
access to victims’ systems. Attackers used these techniques to overcome various forms of
defenses. Sanghvi and Dahiya (2013) described some of the most common system tools
(ie., Snort, Nmap, and TCP Dump) that attackers can use to collect data and make port
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detections. Stewart et al. (2015) focused on Nmap scanning tools that are used to detect
the existing state of each network port and IP protocols, as well as tools that make use of
timing options, remote operating system detection, port filtering, and parallel scanning.
By scanning ports, attackers gain access to aspects of the targeted system exposed to
attack, and they identify those that they cannot attack. Researchers have not examined
several new tools, including Wireshark, and attackers are developing new tools that
create challenges for cyber-defense.
Wireshark is a software tool that can read the organization of various networking
protocols. Security professionals used Wireshark for defensive mechanisms such as an
IDS (Banerjee, Vashishtha, & Saxena, 2010). Others used it to seize the packets
(TCP/UDP) from networks, whether wired or wireless. Wireshark acts as a wire sniffer
and penetrates the operational scopes of various network protocols. Wireshark is able to
access TCP streams of the network on which the system operates. It is a sniffer because it
can read all the operational movements of a browser and determine all the processes
taking place on the browser, which includes all forms of clear-text passwords that the
browser may have. Orebaugh, Burke, Perce, Wright, and Morris (2007) noted that
Wireshark’s power stems from its ability to overpower data packets found on the network
interface in which it operates.
Enumeration
Enumeration is the process of collecting information about targeted companies’
systems by linking to the systems and managing queries. The enumeration phase includes
performing tests to discover weaknesses and to create holes in a system. Once the link
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has been established, the victim system could send notice of connection proof. The
confirmation banner can comprise information about product name and version number
of the facility. From a security service, hackers can obtain valuable data. In this phase,
attackers identify operating systems and applications to mine information. Attackers can
extract information about service from the systems, user names, computer systems, and
network resources. Attackers make a link with targeted systems to execute command
queries. The information provides possible attack steps. In the enumeration phase, several
attack programs exist that allow unauthorized access (Harris & Maymi, 2016). Attackers
enumerate the following: network sources, user names and groups, applications and
banners, IP table, routing tables, simple network management protocol (SNMP), and
DNS details. Enumeration is the process of uncovering vulnerabilities of targeted
business sectors to perform successful attacks.
Attacking
Groundwork gives the attackers information on how to successfully attack the
systems. If attackers successfully breach the systems, this process is ephemeral. If they do
not successfully breach the systems, attackers modify the exploit, adjust payload, retune
the vector, and relaunch system attack. Attackers perform virus attacks, password
cracking, and other unauthorized processes on target systems to ensure systems function
and respond in a manner that suits the attacker rather than the host (Harris & Maymi,
2016).
In an attacking phase, attackers can install malicious software to launch DoS
attack. Conrad et al. (2015) and Harris and Maymi (2016) mentioned that after attackers
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gain entry into a system through hacking, they can introduce all forms of malicious
software to gain total control over the system. Attackers can gain access to files and
programs on the system and try to use these in such a way that there is no trace of their
activity. Attackers can also replace programs running on the host system with harmful
applications, commonly Trojan horses and other malicious software. Although the IDSs
frequently sense the modified system file, experienced attackers generally escape
detection by concealing traces of their presence (Stewart, 2011).
DoS attackers achieve their success by using several attackers and controlled or
breached computer systems as the basis to attack Internet traffic. DoS attacks make the
business services unreachable for the service to be delivered.
Cyber-Security
DoS are agents that attackers use to attack business cyber-security systems. To
understand the extant writing on cyber-security and DoS attacks, it is important to
understand cyber-security in the field of cyber-security attacks. Despite the near
ubiquitous use of the term cyber-security, there is no agreement on a precise conceptual
understanding of the term. According to the Cyber Security Enhancement Act (2005),
cyber-security is “the prevention of damage to, the protection of, and the restoration of
computers, electronic communications systems, electronic communication services, wire
communication, and electronic communication, including information contained therein,
to ensure its availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation” (p.
3). The focus of this approach is on the protection, prevention, and restoration of a
company’s values. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST, 2011)
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described cyber-security as the skill to secure or guard the operation of Internet
communication from attacks. Sheldon and McDonald (2012) viewed cyber-security as an
appropriately installed software system that neutralizes cyber-security attacks with DoS
or malware and employs secure measures to safeguard confidentiality, integrity, and
availability. An advanced cyber-security software system or a defense tool is a technique
that can be used to secure information and network systems from attackers using DoS.
Cyber-security involves taking action to protect and safeguard a computer system against
attacks.
A lack of consensus around the conceptual understanding of cyber-security could
cause confusion. That confusion often leads to different cyber-security approaches and
prevents nations from using common strategies to protect information systems. Despite
this ambiguity, cyber-security is a body of different processes, practices, and technologies
created to protect organizational computers, data, networks, and personal databases from
DoS or malicious attackers. The function of cyber-security is to guarantee the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data (Harris & Maymi, 2016) and to provide
protection to computer-related components and software so that unauthorized personnel
do not have access to stored data (Stewart et al., 2015).
Current State of Guardianship
Defensive or guardian systems used by businesses to prevent DoS attacks
generally fall into three categories: firewalls, IDS, and antimalware programs.
Firewalls. A firewall is network protection mechanism that verifies the traffic
going into and out of a network. It is a part of network security because of the functions
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that it performs in a given network (Conrad et al., 2015). According to Harris and Maymi
(2016), firewalls come in either software or hardware forms, and they are suitable for
analyzing the data packets flowing into and out of networks. A firewall creates a
permission forum that only allows approved programs to pass through the network.
Harris and Maymi described the nature and functions of firewalls used to create secure
and trusted networks.
The dynamic nature by which traffic-related network attacks take place makes it
necessary for firewalls to have variable functionality. Depending upon the nature of the
attack, a firewall may need to operate in different formats. Harris and Maymi (2016)
described various types of firewalls. The first carries out filtering at the IP packet level,
ensuring that attackers do not hack the IP address of the network under surveillance in the
first place. A second type of firewall filter is at the TCP session level, and it ensures that
even if the hacker succeeds in bypassing the IP, the TCP will be secure against further
entry. The last kind of firewall filters are at the application level and clear all incoming
programs to ensure the elimination of unsafe ones (Stewart et al., 2015). Even with these
different types of firewalls, attackers continue to devise means of gaining entry. Such
attackers send ICMP packets to overpower DoS defenses, virtual private networks, and
web security, thereby blocking communication between a targeted system and its peers.
Stewart et al. (2015) endorsed the need to ping vulnerable systems with ICMP Echo
Request.
Sanghvi and Dahiya (2013) indicated several methods for detection that can also
act as pre-attack mechanisms to stop port scanning from succeeding. However, attackers
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are developing means to bypass firewall policies. Some of the new versions of attacks
include e-mail-based Trojan horse attacks and stealth scanning techniques. Attackers who
bypass firewall and virtual private network defenses have often been able to disable
permitted protocols. Thus, they can use port scanning techniques to gain access to
otherwise robust and secure network systems (Harris & Maymi, 2016). Firewalls cannot
perfectly protect systems from breaches by attackers.
Intrusion detection systems. Unlike conventional firewall systems, which
monitor network traffic, the aim of an IDS is to detect security penetration. Harris and
Maymi (2016) and Kesan and Hayes (2012) considered an IDS to be an active detective
defense tool that helps to determine whether attackers breached the system. Three
conventional elements of IDS are a sensor that gathers traffic data, an analyzer that
examines attempted or completed suspicious activity, and a user who forwards alerts to
the security manager (Harris & Maymi, 2016; Kesan & Hayes, 2012). The interaction
between the intruder malware and the IDS forms a game in which the virus tries to infect
a system undetected while the IDS tries to alert networks to malicious activity.
Harris and Maymi (2016) and Conrad et al. (2015) described different types of
IDSs. Network-based IDSs are software or hardware that monitor network traffic and
examine packet payloads before they go to the target. Host-based IDS (HIDS) tools are
installed on servers to detect malicious action, scrutinize systems data, and monitor
changes. HIDS are used to identify abnormalities on the host systems that network-based
IDS cannot detect. Rule-based IDSs are used to detect attack activities. Statistical IDSs
are used for anomaly detection mode and to establish a learning manner to make a profile
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of normal activity. These IDSs identify unusual activities, inspect trial files, and identify
suspicious attempts by employing a blend of pattern matching and guidelines. A
signature-based IDS compares data in packet headers to known attacks stored in a
database. Signature IDSs have two weaknesses: comparing the large flow of traffic with
every signature in the database and detecting new forms of attacks.
An IDS is a sophisticated auditing log and traffic monitoring tool that reveals
many malicious actions. However, an IDS does not represent total protection of the
system of a company from DoS attacks. Malware developers intensify their efforts to
infect computer systems as a part of the game between the malware and the IDS.
Intrusion prevention systems. Intrusion detection systems have become
powerful and sophisticated and often incorporate prevention mechanisms that changed
cyber-security for businesses. Like Trost (2010), Harris and Maymi (2016) examined
how IDS’s and intrusion prevention systems (IPS) work in intrusion analysis. IPS can use
these systems for attack analysis, damage mitigation, and attacker tracking. Much of the
work done by Trost involves techniques and business drivers of intrusion detection and
prevention and an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses associated with
mainstream monitoring tools. The use of IPS technologies and attack graphs for mapping
the path of network vulnerability serves as a means of achieving the proactive prevention
of intrusion. According to Harris and Maymi, IPS is an extension of IDS and detects both
traffic and activities. IPS’s hinder detected invasions. Despite this breakthrough in new
defense tools, no device prevents all DoS attacks; the game is ongoing.
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Antimalware. Antimalware is the general term for programs that users employ to
prevent, detect, and eliminate hazardous programs such as DoS malware bots or botnet,
viruses, and worms (Harris & Maymi, 2016). Harris and Maymi (2016) also provided
methods for defending against each type of attack. A botnet is a kind of malware that
installs itself on many computers through infected e-mails, Trojan horses, and shared
media. This type of virus uses to perform DoS attacks.
To identify various types of antimalware, signature detection is one of the most
effective techniques (Harris & Maymi, 2016; Silnov, 2013). This technique evaluates the
contents of the files stored in databases against identified malware signatures or code
sequences. Antivirus software examines e-mails and files, compares them with the
signatures, and stores them in the system’s database. When they match, the antivirus
software detects the viruses within the files. Although Silnov (2013) and Harris and
Maymi (2016) agreed that this technique is effective; they also observed that it responds
slowly to new attacks. To protect companies from DoS botnet malware attacks and
overcome this weakness in the signature detection technique, information security
practitioners and researchers introduced heuristic techniques (Harris & Maymi, 2016).
Security professionals use heuristic techniques to scrutinize the structure of malware
code, evaluate the instructions of the code, and assess the probability of malevolence.
Heuristic techniques exhibit high performance, although they often have a high rate of
false positives that result in flagging files that contain no malware. Although the false
positive rate is high, heuristic software may have difficulty detecting newly developed
malicious code (Kaspersky, 2013).
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According to Harris and Maymi (2016), in contrast to the signature-based or
heuristic scanning technique, behavior blocking software integrates itself into the
operating system of the main (host) system and examines the entire system to prevent
malicious activities. The system monitors and screens the interaction and compatibility of
the malicious code with the system’s operating system. When the behavior blocking
software finds that the malicious code is about to affect the integrity of the system, it
blocks and restricts the actions of the harmful codes. Continuous monitoring requires
high levels of proficiency, as well as organizational and system resources.
Signature-based is not effective for safeguarding a company’s systems with
regard to identifying new malware. This performance is also a weakness of behavior
blocking antimalware. Amro and Alkhalifah (2015) questioned why viruses spread and
bypass antivirus defense software without detection. Attackers use more systemadaptable malicious code, and cyber-security breaches have become more complex and
harder to detect. Antimalware installations scan and detect malware at networking access
points but were ineffective for more complex malware designed to avoid this sort of
detection (Harris & Maymi, 2016). Despite firewalls, IDSs, and antimalware, attackers
attack organizational cyber-security systems successfully.
Guardianship Actions
Cyber-security defense involves a variety of different measures based on the type
of attack. Several cyber-security defenders used a countermeasures model to protect their
infrastructures from DoS attacks. The focus of defenses is on risk reduction through
increasing effective cyber-security systems. There is often one corresponding
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countermeasure for every available attack (Harris & Maymi, 2016). Countermeasures
operate by detecting, preventing, and mitigating threats (Harris & Maymi, 2016);
countermeasure should be able to cope with new technological innovation.
Passive versus active defense. Cyber-security systems use both passive and
active techniques to counteract DoS attacks. These systems have several inadequacies
with regard to protecting information. Kesan and Hayes (2012) studied passive systems
in comparison to the level of threat that comes from modern cyber-security attackers
found deficiencies in defensive capabilities versus cyber-attack capabilities. Active
defenses are suitable because users can trace and actively respond to threats posed by an
attack, in addition to targeting the attack itself. Kesan and Hayes noted that defense
generally involves interrupting a pending attack and active defenses work via a mitigation
process. The mechanism by which active defense operates on attacks is active threat
neutralization, which includes offensive actions that neutralize threats but do not
necessarily retaliate against the threats or attacks. Although this may sound convincing in
terms of improving cyber-security, further research is necessary to verify the confidence
levels of the trace-backs performed by the active defense to ensure their accuracy.
Detection. Detection is the most important measure in the incident reaction. In
Conrad et al. (2015)’s assumptions, cyber-security experts use the detection phase to
decide whether an event has occurred. This process involves identifying any security
breaches that take place within a system as used in information security systems. When
prevention fails in security systems, detection can fill the gap. According to Straub and
Nance (1990), finding computer misuse involves three methods: unintentional finding,
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finding in the course of internal system managements, and finding focused on revealing
actions. Hoffer and Straub (1989) pointed out that most company security professionals
do not carry out this form of detection. Consequently, the discovery of most cyber-attacks
with malware is accidental or through normal system control.
Prevention. As a security measure, prevention refers to a means of not
experiencing an attack with DoS. Prevention has several forms, including using guards,
authentication devices, identifying traffic patterns, and firewalls (Harris & Maymi, 2016).
Prevention ensures threats do not surface at all. Harris and Maymi (2016) and Conrad et
al. (2015) stressed that prevention is a commonly used cyber-security system. Preventive
efforts can be effective for cyber-security.
Problems for Guardianship
Attempts to have an all-in-one security solution to protect against Internet-based
DoS attacks include several additional factors, including the nature of different
institutions; diverse security needs across companies and departments; and the number of
different applications commonly used by businesses, including e-mail, electronic
commerce, and databases (Andress, 2011). The various current applications and systems
posed a challenge for system administrators to secure the confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of all services. Overarching security solutions make it difficult to protect
companies’ information systems in multiple application systems. When diverse computer
systems lack a common approach to cyber-security, it becomes difficult to create a
corresponding, all-in-one security solution (Harris & Maymi, 2016).
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The diversity of computer platforms, operating systems, and architectures has
inspired an equally diverse array of tactics, schemes, and strategies for disabling or
compromising them from remote areas of the world (Stewart et al., 2015). Complicated
types of cyber-attacks with DoS occurred at various levels and regions of the world
against every kind of computer system in existence (Amoroso, 2011). In information
systems with many diverse components, DoS attackers can block networks, inhibit access
for businesses, and lurk in the system (Conrad et al., 2015).
Targeted Attacks
Targeted attacks pose several threats to the financial sector, as they jeopardize
network accessibility, performance, and discretion. The attacks can also destroy the
communication infrastructure through service sabotage and breaching of systems.
Targeted attacks cause damage to their victims because of the care that attackers take in
planning and execution (Adomi, 2011). Attackers launch attacks to break down the
network’s infrastructure to grant intruders easy and prolonged access to enhance data
theft. The threat posed by targeted attacks is large (Villeneuve, 2011). According to
Chapple and Seidl (2015), opportunistic attacks are less lethal than targeted attacks
because the latter entails infiltrating a particular target with the primary intent to malign a
firm’s targeted business.
DoS attacks can target any business that uses a Website. According to the Trend
Micro (2015) study, the following traits qualify an attack as being targeted: (a) foremost,
the culprits bear in mind a particular potential victim, perform their background checks
on the target and invest a substantial amount of energy towards developing the attack and
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executing it; (b) a great volume of DoS attacks are ensured by the creation of botnets by
the attack; and (c) the culprits spend a substantial amount of energy in actualizing the
attack and carrying it out over and over again. A focused attack is, therefore, one where a
particular company is targeted. Seeing as the actions and moves made by the attackers in
a targeted attack are tweaked to accomplish the mission in particular, they are more
harmful and cause more damage. Targeted attacks entail meticulous layout of strategy;
they take place as soon as the attacker chooses; they focus on a particular target in order
that they can attain their desired goal; and the attackers are able to knock the victims off
using DoS as opposed to illegally acquiring information.
One of the largest forms of cyber-threats is the targeted attack, as was revealed in
Trend Micro (2015) research in the contemporary Internet-linked world. All websites,
online business servers or networks are prone to DoS attacks with a loss of reputation and
monetary standing being considered the worst that a targeted corporation stands to lose.
Some of the main reasons why targeted attacks are launched include control maintenance,
unwarranted usage of systems, target infections, and collection of intelligence. According
to Sood and Enbody (2014), when launched, a targeted attack is classified as one that is
after a particular entity, be it a user, an organization or a company, in order that it can
either gain access to its crucial assets or corrupt its networks.
O’Leary et al. (2017) argued that a targeted attack had to have a scope, an element
of persistence, and effort, similar in terms of the nature of the targeted attacks and their
characteristics. Scope, persistence, and level of effort were defined as follows: (a) scope:
the attackers narrow down to a specific entity; (b) persistence: effort is made to
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coordinate the activities being carried out in order that particular aims are realized as
opposed to rushing the attack with the aim of bypassing the security threats in place; and
(c) level of effort: A substantial amount of time, effort, and resources are applied in order
to enact the attack. By stating characteristics of targeted attacks as being intentional,
having a directive, and being tenacious, O’Leary et al. showed the importance of
stratifying the different types of attacks according to whether they are targeted or not.
There are high chances that an attack is targeted if it is identified as being aimed at a
particular target or an assortment of targets with similar characteristics (for example
companies in a common sector), leading to a conclusion that attacks that are targeted, to
some extent, have an inclination toward monetary gain. Application of various styles and
technology may be evident, and the attacker could apply different means as necessary to
accomplish their mission.
Bendovschi, Al-Nemrat, and Ionescu (2016) gathered and studied numerical data
of cyber-attacks collected by Verizon, a prominent company in the international security
sector. The data included information about 4,785 attacks and the targets, the culprit, the
weaknesses that made it possible for the ambush to occur, the consequence of the attack,
and the approximate incurred damages. Their study led to a conclusion drawn by the
National Cyber Security Center (2016) that attacks that were not targeted did not pose as
critical a threat as those that were targeted, simply because by targeting, the attack is
customized to inflict more damage as opposed to a stray attack. Unleashing of botnets is
an example of an attack that is targeted.
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With reference to the description of targeted attacks, several researchers
(Bendovschi, 2015; Bendovschi et al., 2016; Whalen, 2017; Wueest, 2014) examined the
relationship between business sectors and DoS attacks. However, this body of work does
not give attention to, or include in their studies, the relationship between the rate of
attacks and business sector or generated revenues and assets. Indeed, differences among
business sectors in attack rates, duration of attacks, and financial damages resulting from
attacks has not been examined in previous studies. Nor did they examine the relationships
between company assets and revenues and the duration of attacks as well as the financial
damages resulting from attacks. The criteria of targeted attacks (O'Leary et al., 2017;
Trend Micro, 2015) can be considered relevant and significant to this study: having a
specific target in mind, creating botnets to increase volume of DoS attacks, and focusing
on specific organizations within an industry.
Motivation
The most apparent result of DoS attacks is unavailability of the service to the
authentic customers; however, the objectives of the culprits are rarely clear and may vary
significantly. Nonetheless, according to the lion’s share of researchers, while causing
damage to the victim is among the aims of DoS attacks, as is affluence within the hacker
community, the main agenda is barricading the present resources, or performance
degradation of the service needed by the machine that is targeted, to achieve material
gain.
Sood and Enbody (2014) suggested that targeted attacks aim at corrupting
business proceedings and are not solely for industrial espionage and monetary gain.
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However, Semantic’s (2015) indicated that the bulk of focused attacks in the financial
sector are highly probable to be geared towards financial gain by the attackers. This
research grouped attack motivation into three categories: financial motivation, espionage
motivation, and political motivation. Exposure of banks to ‘mass market’ attacks was just
as frequent as with other organizations making them, as well as other financial sectors,
more susceptible to targeted attacks spanning IT security domains.
Regarding the motivation of DoS attacks Amoroso (2013), indicated that the need
to demonstrate their prowess and achieve financial gains motivates attackers. In other
words, hackers are motivated by the desire for fame and recognition. Supporting these
findings, Prasad, Reddy, and Rao (2014) noted that financial gain, reputation,
philosophical belief, and retaliation are the key drivers. Further, Madarie (2017) noticed
that attackers want to demonstrate their ability to overcome hurdles using creativity and
innovative computer skills. Sociocultural and political gain are two motivations that are
beyond the scope of this study. Security experts found several reasons for cyberintrusions, including theft of data and money, disruption of network functioning,
blackmail, and economic sabotage (Lawrence et al., 2017). Regardless of the driving
force behind them, new DoS attacks target companies’ networks on a regular basis.
However, researchers have not located any common factors that influence the targeting of
companies and their holdings.
For many researchers, the leading indicators for attacks remain perplexing,
particularly because the main aims of DoS attacks often remain unknown, despite the
attacker’s claims of responsibility (Shakarian et al., 2013). For example, according to The
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Economist (2014), the motivation for targeting the financial sector remains unknown.
Several theories emerged to explain the attacks, including hackers employed by nation
states to retaliate against laws or to acquire critical data. Some network hacking could be
the result of foreign countries colluding with individuals to obtain financial information.
Notably, theft of data for monetary gains has emerged as a driving factor behind network
attacks. Various business sectors were victims of financially targeted attacks.
Looking at attacks in the context of targeting company assets and other holdings
produces a more useful picture. Van Beveren and Falkinder (2005) explained that
malware often exists to make a financial profit or otherwise exploit lucrative situations.
Harris and Maymi (2016) noted the financial motive as well, but they also indicated that
attackers use DoS to inflict chaos, which can range from being beneficial to the hackers
to being destructive. Hackers target a range of assets, from individual users to
government institutions and multinational corporations.
The frequency of cyber-attacks with DoS varies between different sectors and
companies within each sector. This variation could be due to differences in asset and
revenue values. One of the limitations of previous studies is that they were not
longitudinal. They rested on short-term reports and case studies rather than examining a
company’s assets and revenues over decades. Further, the scholars could not identify
whether financial profiles, fame or reputation, or other cultural situations serve as
motivations for DoS attacks. Researchers have not studied DoS attacks targeting
companies based on their sector types, assets or revenues.
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Targeted Business Sectors
Because there are several avenues to attack company computer systems, there are
many motivations to attack. Although the motivations behind DoS attacks against targets
are not known, certain business sectors seem to be vulnerable. From 2009 to 2013, cyberinfiltration in the healthcare and insurance sectors increased. McGee (2014) noted that
healthcare-related companies are vulnerable to attackers because of the sensitive
information on their networks. In their cyber-attack study, Sood and Enbody (2014)
claimed that insurance firms became targets for cyber-attacks. Unauthorized intrusions
expose medical firms to blackmail risks because patient information (i.e., identifying
details, medical records, and financial status) may enter the public domain.
The Identity Theft Resource Center (2014) reported that the financial, insurance,
education, and business sectors are the most attractive for targeted cyber-attacks. Akamai
(2015) reported the gaming industry as being the most widely attacked by DoS threats as
compared to any other sector during the Q1 of 2015 and in the same manner, as from Q2
of 2014.
On the other hand, Rivalhost Managed Web Hosting (2013) identified the finance
sector as the most targeted. Verisign (2014) reported that in the second quarter of 2014,
media represented 43% of all targeted attacks, closely followed by IT services at 41% of
the attacks. Verisign also reported telecommunication service, institutions of finance, and
the public sector as targeted sectors. Akamai (2015) indicated that the gaming sector,
software, and media were the most threatened sectors by the DoS flood attacks. Yadav
and Gour (2014) identified web-based business (financial services, retail, travel) as the
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main targeted sector. They also stated that no field is spared from DoS threats. Clearly,
there is no consensus among researchers on the most commonly targeted sectors types.
In addition to examining the most targeted business industries, researchers also
examined the industries most threatened by DoS attacks in terms of what they stand to
lose. On the Internet hosting provider DoS attacks, Rivalhost Managed Web Hosting’s
(2013) study indicated that one of the highest rated victims of DoS attacks being Internet
service providers with such attacks being complicated and set on precise websites leading
to a spread in the network causing its impacts to be felt by different customers. As a
result, sites that deal in Ecommerce are in a position to lose much more from such
attacks. The researchers found that the DoS attacks continues to be a problem for
businesses large and small. Similarly, Yadav and Gour (2014) reported that the industries
most threatened by DoS were those dealing in web-based transactions, the likes of
telecom services, financial services, travel, retail, and IT. Wueest (2014) identified the
energy sector as a field with great risk as attacks would result in catastrophic disorder and
a chain of effects whose eventuality would be monetary loss.
Over the 3 years of Bendovschi’s (2015) study of patterns and trends in
cybercrime, a compelling relationship was established between the kinds of industries in
question and the kinds of threats experienced, which led to the conclusion that cybercrime was a menace to all types of business regardless of the public domain being the
most sought-after target. Specifically, Bendovschi showed that most sectors are targeted
with DoS attacks and identified DoS as being the threat most frequent type of attack from
the array of the many in existence. Cyber-attacks became a threat to all sector scales
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(private companies, Internet and online services, retail education, online services,
finance, not-for-profit organizations). Those conducting the attacks are primarily
targeting information that could be of value. Their aim is to gain access to information
with the capability of earning either them or the associated sponsors great benefits.
Through the process of reviewing Verizon’s data, Bendovschi et al. (2016) revealed that
they could identify relationships between the attacks carried out.
Financial Damages
On the consequence of financial damage with DoS attacks, Anderson et al. (2013)
classified damage or loss into direct and indirect damages. The line of reasoning was the
direct loses comprise of infrastructural downtime, loss of online traffic, paid ransom and
customer compensation among others while indirect damage is when the reputation or the
stock price is damaged. An unavailability of networking access for users can result in
financial loss for targeted business sectors. In addition to financial loss, the consequences
of DoS attacks can embrace brand and reputation damage, loss if investor confidence,
and violation of service agreement.
Though attacks that deny computer access result in financial loss in the business
sector, Pau (2013) asserted that there is minimal body of evidence on assessment of
damage. According to his study, companies are unable to approximate the kind of loss
they incur when their systems are infiltrated whether successfully or unsuccessfully. He
thus proposed that it is imperative to take into consideration the relationship of other
targets and the bodies affected by the targeted system and its related bodies and how an
infiltration affects the sustainability of the entire organization. Considering finance and
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economics, a critical question is on the allocation of assets when aiming at some
performance goals.
Anderson et al. (2012) focused on different business organizations such as online
retailers, business to business hubs, online marketplaces, Internet-based advertisers,
streaming media services, and Internet commerce business. These kinds of organizations
incur direct forms of revenue loss from any form of disruption whether the infiltration is
successful or unsuccessful. A common feature within these organizations is that the
mode of receiving revenue is in minutes or even seconds. Profits cannot be attained
when there is a disruption or can be reduced in the course of a disruption (Anderson et
al., 2013). Previous researchers did not focus on revenues and assets, but the research
that focuses on business sector attractiveness and targets, damages, and sector types are
valuable support to this research project.
Business Values
As businesses or industries are categorized according to the type of their
economic activities, assets and revenues are fundamental elements of business sectors.
Assets are resources with economic value that the business owns and that are recorded in
companies’ balance sheets (Siegel, Dauber, & Shim, 2005). Assets represent the value
of a sector or possession that can be transformed into cash. Assets can be largely
classified into current, fixed, financial investment, and intangible assets. Current assets
are short-term economic resources that can be changed into cash within a year period;
Current assets include cash, accounts receivable, and other resources. Compared to
current assets, fixed assets are long-term sources that include plant, equipment, and
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buildings (CFI, 2018). According to Bragg (2017), fixed assets are items that generate
economic benefits over a long period of time. However, accounting for fixed assets is not
uniform throughout the world. Financial assets represent investments, such as banks,
stocks, and bonds, whose values derive from contractual claim of what they represent.
Further, intangible assets are economic resources that have no tangible presence,
including patent, trademark, intellectual property, and copyright. Reilly and Schweihs
(2014) stated that intangible assets’ value comes from the ability to exploit the legal
rights related to the asset. Assets are recorded in reports, such as those compiled by
Forbes. As an example, according to the most recent Forbes (2018) report, JPMorgan
Chase has $2,609.8 billion assets and Amazon has $131.3 B. Prudential was the largest
insurance business sector in the United States with assets amounting $596 billion
(Statista, 2017).
Revenues are the income that a business sector received from its business activity
(Bondarenko, 2014). Most revenue comes from sales of goods or services, as such
revenue is also referred to as sales or turnover. Revenue depends upon business activities,
for some businesses, interest royalties or other types of fees are revenues (Carcello,
2008). For several businesses, such as manufacturing, retail, or grocery, revenues come
from the sale of goods. Service businesses receive most of their revenue from rendering
services. Banks receive revenue from fees and interest generated by lending assets. In
general, revenue is the amount of income a business sector is generating from sales of
products or services. The more revenue a sector generates, the more money the sector
owns. In 2016, 500 United States businesses generated $12 trillion in combined revenue.
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In addition, the social media sector has rapidly increased its revenues by 44% in 2015
compared to its 2014 revenues (Frohlich & Comen, 2016).
In relation to this study, Leukfeldt and Yar (2016) noticed that value has a
financial character and cyber-attackers are interested in assigned value. The concept of a
suitable target in RAT is a combination of value, and attackers are interested in assigned
value. As such, assets and revenue might likely play a role in the risk for DoS targeted
attacks. However, Cayubit et al. (2017) indicated that little research has endeavored to
determine hackers’ motivations because the motives behind the acts of attacking are often
obscure.
Attack Targeted Metrics
The body of literature about DoS attacks on companies’ information networks
includes scholarship about targeting companies’ assets and other holdings (Camillo,
2017), detecting attacks (Jasiul, Szpyrka, & Sliwa, 2014; Raj Kumar & Selvakumar,
2011; Xuan, Shin, Thai, & Znati, 2010), protecting against security breaches (Dzurenda,
2015; Rajesh, 2013; Ramesh, 2013), making efforts to mitigate the effects of cyberattacks (Patil & Kulkarni, 2011), studying system vulnerability (Harris & Maymi, 2016;
Villeneuve, 2011), and exploring hackers’ motivations (Amoroso, 2013; Hughes &
Cybenko, 2013). However, researchers have not addressed the metrics how and why
attackers choose their targets. In particular, researchers have not investigated the role of
financial metrics in determining business sectors and target candidates for cyber-attack.
Tajalizadehkhoob et al. (2014) drew upon RAT (a motivated offender, a suitable target,
and the absence of guardian) to describe why criminals go after a certain target and
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examined DoS attacks through the lens of the economics of crime, but they did not
categorize targets by assets or revenues. I attempted to address this gap by searching for a
relationship between a business’s financial value and the duration of DoS attacks against
it and resulting financial damages.
The concept of metrics entails the allocation of values to objects, while the
procedure that is employed in approximating an object’s qualities is known as a
measurement. Often, measurement is categorized into groups: nominal, ordinal, interval,
or ratio measurement which is the topmost form of measurement. Metrics are considered
integral in creating security systems because of the ability to denote cause-effect
relationships between cyber-attacks. Several cyber-security attack researchers (Behal &
Kumar, 2017; Mateski et al., 2012; Mishra & Saini, 2013; Verendel, 2009; Savola, 2009)
used various metrics to measure cyber-attacks, including technical, operational weakness
volumetric attack-oriented, attacks taxonomy, business targeted types, and scale of
security metrics-nominal, ordinal and interval. In quantitative studies on cyber security,
Verendel (2009) grouped different kinds of literature based on the methods used for
validation, perspective, and assumptions made regarding the quantitative security and,
lastly, based on the targets. One rare study that developed a DoS attack metrics was
conducted by Savola (2009), who used a holistic approach based on the fundamentals of
security metrics. Savola’s metrics categorized goals into control areas and targeted users.
To fill the research gaps in studies conducted by Verendel (2009) and Mishra and Saini
(2013), this study employed a holistic perspective to categorize system-wide DoS attacks
based on differences of rates of attacks, duration of attacks, and financial damages across

78
business sector types and to categorize the relationship of DoS attack duration and
financial damages to assets and revenues.
Other researchers (Tajalizadehkhoob et al., 2014) examined target selection
attacks (attack choices) to ascertain the advancement of attacks metrics. According to
Tajalizadehkhoob et al. (2014), security metrics can be divided based on several factors.
Some of the factors integral in this classification are the goals for providing security,
vulnerable areas, targeted systems, and temporal dimension. Mateski et al. (2012)
focused on threat actions identified that the most commonly used security metrics are
threat metrics (target no specific entity, high values entities, critical assets, specific
single entity), taxonomy attacks, volumetric attack results, goal and business targeted
metrics. In this study, the researcher identified whether some sectors are targeted more
frequently than others, providing information about whether some sectors are more
attractive than others to be targeted.
In examining other researchers’ attack metrics, Romanosky (2016) identified that
banks are the most vulnerable organizations when it comes to attacks though some are
targeted more frequently compared to others. Online banks were found to be more
vulnerable than physical banks. Data network organizations also were found to be
vulnerable to these attacks. Attackers use DoS attacks as a strategy to attack
organizational systems and target financial services. Trend Micro (2019) also confirmed
the notion that banks are more likely to be DoS targets. Tajalizadehkhoob et al. (2014)
used metrics based on RAT to determine a selection of cyber-crime targets. The model
indicates that there are three key factors that explain why criminals chose targets:
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motivation, suitability of a target, and the lack of proper protection. Tajalizadehkhoob et
al. used metrics to examine the number of botnets that attacked a given domain in a one
week. This helped in evaluating the size and attractiveness of different banks in the
United States. However, Tajalizadehkhoob et al. faced a challenge in collecting existing
data to examine targeted choice patterns. As a result, the current study’s variable was
business sector types to examine DoS targeted attacks and to contribute to previous
studies’ findings that attackers tend to favor certain financial services over others.
Theoretical Foundation
Modern criminology has begun perceiving the emergence of cyber-crime as new
crime activity; scholarly research into cyber-crime increased over the last 20 years. This
introduces a challenge to the scholars of effectively applying the knowledge, skills, and
concepts used in a normal world setting into the cyber-attacks. To address the issues of
cyber-crime attacks, in a breadth and depth viewpoint, identifying the relevance and
efficacy of criminological theories that apply to DoS attacks helps to distinguish the
association of targeted attacks and the value (assets, revenues) of businesses sector types.
The theoretical foundation of this study was based on Cohen and Felson’s (1979)
RAT and Cornish and Clarke’s (1987) RCT. These two theories serve as a foundation for
cyber-security attack in literature. It is important to identify attackers’ targeted attacks
using DoS, as well as to understand attackers’ choices regarding which companies or
organizations to target. In this study, the researcher used RAT to explain findings
regarding target suitability (Navarro & Jasinski, 2012); the researcher used RCT to
consider the findings in relation to the decision-making process of attackers based on a
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determination of rewards and to explain how DoS attacks target specific business sectors
with particular financial values.
The remainder of this chapter includes a review of RAT and RCT, including
descriptions of the theories, examples of how researchers use the models, empirical
outcomes of research using these models, the application of these theories to the research
of cyber-attack crime, and discussion of the framework and variables that best explain
business sector value attack with DoS.
Routine Activity Theory (RAT)
Application to crime. The RAT has been used in the field of criminology to
analyze deviance and crime structures since its inception in 1979 by Cohen and Felson.
According to Cohen and Felson (1979), the wealth of modern society provides increased
opportunities for crime to occur, and an attack can be carried out by anyone who has the
opportunity. They identified a natural offender as a component of the environment,
noting that an attack must convene in the space and time of potential criminals, easy
targets, and a lack of guardians. Cohen and Felson’s premise was that postmodernity had
facilitated the junction in space and time of motivated offenders with potential targets.
Their idea was that the opportunity of the crime depends on offender, target and the
absence of guardian. The theory is an attempt to identify attacker activities and their
patterns through elucidation of alterations in crime rate trends. According to Leukfeldt
and Yar (2016), the concepts and applications of the RAT theory vary across research
projects and researchers. However, key components are common to all variations: once
an attacker is motivated, they are in a position to commit a crime at the slightest of
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opportunities; when the target is vulnerable and too exposed, the attacker is further
motivated to commit the crime. Therefore, the offender, the target, and the absence of a
guardian in an enabling environment form the components of crime according to RAT.
Application to cyber-crime. The expansion of computers caused a shift in the
nature of traditional crime. An attacker can commit an attack from anywhere in the
world, block access, and extract information digitally. Reyns, Henson, and Fisher (2011),
Holt (2013), and Reyns (2016) indicated that proper timing and place, coupled with
proper conditions (i.e., a lack of guardianship, availability of target, and motivated
attacker) lead to attack (see Figure 2). In cyber-crime, defense software and firewalls act
in the guardianship role (Harris & Maymi, 2016). According to Décary-Hetú and Dupont
(2012), attackers target companies’ software and find security weaknesses in software
while sharing their findings through online forums. Bendovschi (2015) indicated that
cyber-space has become a platform for an attacker to attack potential targets.

Figure 2. Elements of routine activity theory.
There is disagreement among scholars on how to apply traditional criminological
theory to the study of cyber-crime. Some argue that cyber-crime is a new crime which is
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unique in the sense that the two parties involved may never have contact and, therefore,
require new analytical approaches. For example, Hollis et al. (2013) and Holt (2017)
explained the complexity of employing traditional crime theory to cyber-attack crimes.
Likewise, Holt (2013) described the suitability of RAT to predict some aspects of the
online crimes but also noted its limitations in other aspects of cyber-crime. However,
recently, several scholars applied RAT to examine technology-enabled (cyber-attacks)
attacks (Leukfeldt, 2014; Holt & Bossler, 2014) as an analytical framework to study
cybercrime and found that RAT elements are more applicable to the study. There is data
that supports the use of RAT to analyze cyber-crime (Felson 1986, 1987; Felson & Boba,
2010). RAT has been successfully applied to virtual settings involving social media,
computer networks, and online gaming.
The first scholar to effectively apply the principles of RAT to cyber-attack crime
was Yar in 2005. Yar applied all the main elements of RAT to the virtual world: the
online-motivated offenders mainly comprised of the hackers, and the targets included
personal information and proprietary data. In essence, the more time a person spends on
the Internet, the more likely they may be targeted by the online offenders. As businesses
utilize Internet, they become potential cyber-attack targets. The enabling environment for
such online criminal attack activities is accelerated by data which is not secured online.
Hutchings and Hayes (2009) also examined online activity in relation to phishing, using
RAT as a theoretical foundation for their explanatory studies. Their quantitative crosssectional survey approach revealed that Internet banking users were more often victims of
cyber-attackers. Also, examining existing survey data in combination with RAT
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assumptions, Yucedal (2010) compared home users’ and business users’ online
victimization. In addition to RAT, Yucedal used lifestyle exposure theory for his
theoretical framework, and he framed his findings in relation to individual perceptions of
victimization, cyber-crime, and spyware.
Similarly, applying RAT to cyber-fraud, Pratt et al. (2010) found that
vulnerability to cyber-attack was a result of online exposure. Reyns (2013) studied
identify theft using RAT and found that the use of the Internet for banking and also, the
constant use and forwarding of online messages through emails increased the risk of
cyber-attacks. Specifically, his findings indicated that the risk for cyber-attack of people
who regularly use these online facilities is almost 50% higher compared to those who
rarely use such online services.
Researchers also used RAT to examine approaches to cyber-crime. For example,
Chu and Holt (2015) found that attackers use botnets to attack networks and to scan
vulnerable networks to exploit information. In addition, Chu and Ahn (2010) conducted a
crucial study regarding cyber-trespass, which showed that hackers do not target
individuals but go for bigger populations of Internet users where they use botnets to
attack the computers. Botnets represent groups of computers that are infected (zombies),
and usually more than one hacker can use the botnets for their own ends (Symantec,
2014). Zombies created by attackers are used to carry out large volume of DoS attacks.
Chu et al. (2010) advocated for the application of RAT to these cyber-crimes.
The Symantec (2014) study and the findings from Chu et al. (2010) fit into the
components of the RAT: the hackers, in this case, are the motivated offenders or attacker
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in the study; the potential targets by the cyber-attackers are all the business computers
which are connected networks; the guards are anti-virus software and intrusion detection
systems that are installed on business computers. In other words, there are various ways
to tailor RAT to suit the Internet environment when analyzing cyber-attacks.
Leukfeldt and Yar (2016) studied the suitability of RAT in explaining cyberattacks. According to their findings, they revealed that some aspects of RAT better allow
for an understanding of cyber-attack crime than others. Just as financial values are
especially likely to play a role in on-line offense, visibility clearly plays a role in cybercrime victimization. Therefore, value and visibility, as discussed by Leukfeldt and Yar,
reflect an important aspect of business sector targeted studies.
Application to DoS attacks. I employed the components of RAT that examine
attackers, attack targets (business sector as a target and business assets and revenue as a
target), and the victim (duration of attack and financial damage). The intention is to apply
RAT in a manner that suits the environment of DoS attacks to develop more measures of
linking intent with attractiveness through an extended examination of DoS targeted
attacks.
While RAT is valuable for examining the attractiveness of targets that could result
in an attack, RCT complements RAT by recognizing that the occurrence of crime is a
progressive outcome—not a one-time decision—facilitated by the interaction of potential
offenders and potential victims, as well as the tradeoffs of opportunity, situational factors,
and constraints to the crime committed (Cornish & Clarke, 2008).
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Rational Choice Theory (RCT)
According to Jennings and Beaudry-Cyr (2014), RCT is one of the most
fundamental criminological theories, establishing that the process of rational decision
making enables people to independently decide to take part in criminal activities.
Essentially, people act rationally by measuring the advantages and disadvantages of
participating in criminal activities to find the most advantageous move. Should the
advantages of committing a crime outweigh the disadvantages, then criminals will decide
to take part.
According to Hostettler (2011), the origins of RCT date back to the 18th century
and the utilitarian social philosopher, Cesare Beccaria, who examined the role of people’s
perceptions of pain and pleasure in their decision making. Since Beccaria’s original
influence on RCT, the theory has been extended (Freilich, 2015). A variety of theorists
contributed to the establishment of RCT, including Homans (1961), who created a basic
theoretical framework associated with the exchange theory derived from behaviorist
psychology and analyzed how people carry out their activities. Blau (1964), Coleman
(1973), and Cook (1977) expanded Homan’s work and made RCT applicable to math
application. Until recently, RCT has been the leading method within the social sciences
of conceptualizing the actions of people.
There are various approaches to RCT because there are numerous variations of
the theory customized for different fields. Claude and Siponen (2014) observed that these
variations of RCT had been put into various uses in different fields such as criminology,
political science, sociology, and even the field of economics. Regardless of the field in
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which RCTs were established, they were based on a common assumption of differences
in rationality, starting with total rationality, bounded rationality, and the systematic
rationality to social rationality. Participants seek to fully utilize their resources when
committing their crime by depending on the knowledge they have. Attackers usually have
their own projections, and they work their way out to establish the hidden facts through
their various objectively misconstrued but sensible efforts
While RCT is used in many fields, it has been a dominating paradigm in
Economics, where it is referred to as the neoclassical paradigm. Although RCT has been
tremendously criticized, including critiques of its empirical and conceptual limitations
(Burns & Roszkowska, 2016), it continues to be used in economic research. Apart from
economics, RCT is also largely used in criminology (Steele, 2016).
Application to crime. RCT first was used in criminology studies in 1970s,
drawing on Becker’s (1968) conceptualization of RCT as a way to examine attackers’
decisions of whether or not to attack. Indeed, the classical criminological theory was
founded on the basic principle of actions and decisions that are taken by an individual.
The theory of rational choice is meant to explain how people make their choices; it
highlights that crime is a matter of choice that is intended for benefiting the attacker.
According to RCT, attackers commit a crime after analyzing their options and making a
decision to commit the crime. Cornish and Clarke (2008) noted that individuals
committing crimes make rational decisions prior to making their moves. Attackers are
active decision makers in the process of evaluating alternatives, which indicates that
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attackers are criminals who evaluate rational factors to decide whether and how to
commit crimes (Cornish & Clarke, 2008).
Initial studies in criminology using RCT received empirical backing from many
researchers (D'arcy & Hovav, 2009; Ransbotham & Mitra, 2009; Wilson & Herrnstein,
1985). When RCT was still under development, its sole purpose was to explain particular
types of crime. This was the main intention of Cornish and Clarke during its development
when it received their support for studying sexual harassment cases, theft, and academic
fraud (Exum & Layana, 2016). In the 1980s, Clarke and Cornish (1985) developed three
lenses, which they elaborated on a year later (Cornish and Clarke, 1986), through which
to view human criminal behaviors.
First, crime would be committed by people who perceived the real value in those
acts of crime; they would commit a crime if they saw more pros than cons in their act. As
noted by Steele (2016), the criminal act involves a process of making decisions to
establish advantages and disadvantages, and the decision-making process is often
hampered by the insufficient or lack of information regarding those acts of crime.
Second, decisions about committing crimes are made based on sets of information
and variations in that information. This focus highlighted situations or frameworks of acts
of crime as opposed to focusing the attention on specific people. The focus also allowed
for getting idiosyncrasies of various requirements that came in line with the crime.
Third, criminal acts hinge on decisions made by a particular person in order for
them to take part in committing a crime. The attacker decides to take part in criminal
activities or not through the process of criminal involvement in which the decision had to
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be made from a substantially informed position. This process of decision making does not
rely on an individual’s character; instead, it relies on various levels of information. More
recently, Burns and Roszkowska (2016) updated the three components of RCT: agent,
accessibility to the target, and the opportunity to take action. These components are
similar to the RAT elements of offenders, suitable targets, and absence of guardian.
In 2006, Buldas, Laud, Priisalu, Saarepera, and Willemson created a sequence of
reasoning to analyze an attacker’s decisions. They postulated that any rational attacker
would not go through with committing that crime if it was not beneficial to them. Again,
they stated that attackers will always choose the approaches that will result in the greatest
rewards. In their model of their attacker’s thinking process, Buldas et al. argued that the
attacker needs to have an idea of all his measures and then applies a combination of his
measures to establish a strategic attacking plan. Attackers then assess the profitability of
their plans to see if they will move forward with them. The attackers decide to take part
in the attack as a game. At this point, they put in place all the necessary requirements and
launch their assault on the given system.
Cornish and Clarke (2008) contributed to RCT by stating that crime is intended to
meet attackers’ needs, such as status or money. Attackers must have a motive directing
their focus. Due to varying levels of crime, attackers commit different crimes based on
the returns, risks, and purposes of a crime. Thus, the decision to commit an attack is an
outcome of the factors associated with the nature of each crime. This theoretical view is
essential in the analysis of an attacker’s rational choice related to the criteria of the
companies targeted, the method of attack, and the ability to beat the security
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countermeasures already in place. The RCT theory can serve as a framework to address
the decision of which targets to choose in cyber-attacks.
Application to cyber-crime. Cyber-crime is often quite distinct from a normal
crime whether the attack is on physical entities or targeting information systems, and as
result, it can be difficult to examine or predict. Attackers have countless ways of
launching attacks by involving their rational thinking; hackers weigh several options and
are very methodical when they are carrying out their operations with caution. As such,
using RCT to examine cyber-crime can be challenging. However, there are various
criminal and economic types of RCTs that cyber-security researchers used (Paternoster,
Jaynes, & Wilson, 2017). For example, Bachmann (2010) used RCT to study the activity
of cyber-attackers, measuring cyber-interruption and malicious code dissemination
activities as a way to examine cyber-attacker decision-making activities. Bachmann used
analysis to test the effect of rationality and risk propensity (independent variable) on the
total amount of hacking incidents (dependent variable).
Similarly, using RCT, Hutchings (2014) found that most attackers commit cybercrimes because they are more motivated by the thought that they cannot be arrested.
These attackers sacrifice their time and engage in the crime only to the point when they
deem it to be no longer beneficial. The benefits that come from committing attacks vary
depending on the nature of the crime; common offenses usually come with financial
benefits.
Mandelcorn, Modarres, and Mosleh (2016) developed an RCT-informed cyberattack model, which examined cyber-attacks and their relationship with criminology
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theory. They found that the random attacks they studied were very opportunistic in
nature, and they were carried out without a plan, unlike the planned attacks which were
very strategic and very deliberate. The planned attacks usually involved the attackers
choosing targets and outcomes, such as targeting financial sector by denying access and
further acquiring the confidential information. According to Mandelcorn et al.’s
implementation of cyber-security should be carried out from an attacker’s point of view.
Their model focused on the usefulness of RCT in understanding the attacker's simple
goals and decision-making process.
Application to DoS attacks. Cyber-attack with DoS is a relatively new
phenomenon, which is still under researched due to its complexity. However, RCT is
well-suited to studying DoS attacks because attackers, who likely have everything needed
for an attack at their disposal, employ rational thinking to determine the approach that is
likely to lead to the best results. This study used RCT as a theoretical approach in order to
understand targeted business sector attacks with DoS. Specifically, RCT provided a
framework for analyzing the patterns of attack rates in relation to business sectors and
their values, offering insight into how attackers choose their targets in relation to
expected financial benefits.
Combining two theories. RAT and RCT have, for some time, added value to the
theoretical understanding of the various forms of cyber-crimes. Researchers used the
theories as tools of analyses to examine the motivations of cyber-crimes through their
propositions that when a motivated offender, suitable target, and lack of a capable
guardian converge at a particular time, then cyber-attacks are likely to take place.
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Combining RAT and RCT expanded the scope of understanding of the topic.
Specifically, the focus of RAT is on the required components for an attack to take place
(i.e., attacker, target, and lack of security) while the focus of RCT is on the rational
choices in which the attacker weighs the odds and considers the costs and the benefits.
Although RAT is suitable for a large scale or a macro level, RCT is more suitable for the
small or micro level.
There are various models of RAT and RCT that researchers used to analyze
crime. The model used in this study focused on the targets of DoS attacks; it assumed that
it is possible to apply the RAT and RCT models used to study crime to cyber-crime. The
rationale for employing two theories in this study was that combining two theories can
explain how DoS attacks target specific business sectors and can contribute to a better
awareness of attack in relation to costs and benefits. Two theories, with their variations,
can be used as multi-agent modeling to examine cyber-attack variants.
Summary and Conclusions
In Chapter 2, I reviewed the literature that supports the problem statement and
the theoretical foundation as stated in Chapter 1. I discussed the literature on cyberattacks, cyber-security, targeted attacks, attack metrics, and the theoretical framework for
this study. In addition to the underlying literature on the historical and theoretical
background for this DoS attack inquiry, this review included several other references and
resources. Harris and Maymi (2016) and Conrad et al. (2015) noted that attackers (which
can be script kiddies, crackers, or hackers) used DoS attacks to consume bandwidth and
to bypass firewall and IDSs and IPSs. The dynamic nature and complexities of attack
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systems make it difficult to protect companies from DoS attackers. Attackers often use
reconnaissance techniques to gather as much information about a target’s system as
possible, which could include searching for information using web browsers, using
particular tools to send packets to spot hosts, and detecting services run on the target
computers. The possible dangers of these attacks are network communications
interruptions and cyber-security breaches. Targeted attacks may operate to maximize
attackers’ opportunity to prevent access (Harris & Maymi, 2019; Stewart et al., 2015).
Some researchers of DoS attacks (Conrad et al., 2015; Harris & Maymi, 2016;
Mahjabin et al., 2017) examined categories of attacks, techniques of attackers, defense
mechanisms against attacks, and motivations of attacks. However, studies with different
conclusions exist within the DoS targeted attack literature (e.g., Alomari et al., 2012;
Bendovschi, 2015; Yu, 2014). Several researchers examined the relationship between
business sector and DoS attacks. However, discrepancies exist as a result of metholodical
diffirences; failure to recognize the need to use the business sector as an independent
variable. The rate, duration, and financial damages were not specifically accounted for in
these correlational studies. Recently, Bendovschi et al. (2016), Leukfeldt and Yar (2016),
and O’Leary et al. (2017) endeavored to address the relationships between DoS targeted
attack and business sector. With the exception of these three studies, there is a gap in the
research literature whether attackers target some business sectors with DoS more than
they target others and on whether there is a relationship between targeted attacks and a
company’s generated revenues and assets.
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In Chapter 3, I discuss the purpose of quantitative research and the rationale for
choosing this research approach. I include a description of the research design selected
for this investigation. Most significantly, Chapter 3 includes the details of how the
researcher determined differences among business sectors in attack rates, duration of
attacks, and financial damages resulting from attacks and determined the relationship
between company assets and revenues and the duration of attacks as well as the
relationship between company assets and revenues and the financial damages resulting
from attacks. The chapter includes a detailed explanation of, and justification for, the
research design, including data collection, data analysis, and ethical considerations.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
The literature review in Chapter 2 included an examination and comparison of
various types of DoS attacks, malicious activities and motivations that intensified over
time, existing research on DoS attacks, and the theoretical foundation for this study.
Although researchers provided information about cyber-security, gaps exist in the
literature regarding targeted attacks on companies with DoS and target attractiveness in
relation to business sectors and values. In this study, I conducted the research to fill the
gap. This chapter includes a discussion on the research method, study design and rational,
sampling and sample procedures, instrument design, data collection, and data analysis.
As research is a process of collecting, analyzing, and interpreting data to
understand events and uncover new information (Williman, 2011), it requires an
appropriate methodology. To select an applicable method of inquiry described by its
procedure (Lapan, Quartaroli, & Riemer, 2012) and to gain reliable and valid results to
answer the research questions for a study of DoS attacks, the researcher examined and
compared various theoretical methods of inquiry and selected a quantitative method. I
used a quantitative, nonexperimental methodology to investigate the patterns that could
explain how attackers collectively target business sectors and companies with DoS
attacks. In order to include enough incidents of successful DoS attacks to allow the
researcher to draw conclusions, the researcher included DoS attacks that occurred during
the 19-year time span from 2000–2019. This provided enough information to determine
differences among the five sectors and to examine the relationships between companies’
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assets and revenues and duration of attacks as well as the financial damages resulting
from attacks. I used the quantitative research method to answer the research questions.
Research Design and Rational
Researchers may choose qualitative or quantitative research approaches
(Singleton & Straits, 2017). Quantitative designs include survey research, experimental,
quasi-experimental, nonexperimental, correlational and causal-comparative designs
(Turner, Balmer, & Coverdale, 2013). In nonexperimental designs, researchers can utilize
correlational design to identify the relationship between variables (Turner et al., 2013)
and examine variables using numerical or statistics (Holosko, Jolivette, & Houchins,
2014). I selected a quantitative analysis approach for this study.
Utilizing a quantitative approach, I also examined the relationship between
company assets and revenues and the duration of attacks and relationship between
company assets and revenues and the financial damages resulting from attacks. I
compiled and analyzed archival data for attack rates, duration, and damages between
2000 to 2019. I analyzed the data to test the hypotheses generated by the research
questions.
The research design for this study on DoS attacks was nonexperimental.
Nonexperimental research designs are suitable for studies that involve no manipulation of
the independent variable (Carter & Lubinsky, 2016), no control, and no randomization.
When randomization and manipulation of variables is not possible, ex post facto design is
useful to examine the differences and relationship between variables (Ary, et al., 2010).
The focus of these designs is on measuring independent and dependent variables and
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determining relationships among variables. The goal is to describe phenomena and to
explore and explain relationships among variables (Edmonds & Kennedy, 2013).
I used a dataset compiled from archival reports that include other scholars’
research, as well as reports from network administrators, information security officers,
government agencies, and private companies. The dataset was also compiled from
incident reports on companies obtained from online, publicly accessible incident and
crime reports from 2000 to 2019. Compared with survey research, utilizing a dataset
created from archival data has the advantage of increased accuracy and objectivity. The
major sources of the data for this study were: ComputerWorld, McAfee,
Privacyrights.org, Idtheftcenter.org, IC3, Avtest.org, FBI websites, and Library of
Congress. After the collection of data, I entered into a computer database. I studied
differences among business sectors using the Kruskal-Wallis test to evaluate the
dependent variables across the five sectors. I studied the relationship among assets,
revenues and duration of attacks as well as the financial damages from attacks using
Spearman correlational tests.
Methodology
The research methodology is a systematic way to investigate the research
questions and acquire new understanding (Singleton & Straits, 2017). In this
methodological section, I explain how the Kruskal-Wallis tests and Spearman correlation
analysis were used to determine the differences of attack rates, duration of attacks, and
financial damages resulting from attacks among sectors as well as to examine the
relationship among assets and revenues and the duration of attacks as well as the financial
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damages from attacks. I then describe how the research questions that derived from the
theoretical foundation and literature review were tested and how the research was
conducted. I used quantitative statistical analyses, specifically Kruskal-Wallis tests and
Spearman correlation, to analyze data (number of attacks, length of attacks, financial
damages, assets, and revenues) and to answer the research questions so that other
investigators can replicate the findings. In general, the purpose of a quantitative study is
to examine hypotheses (Morgan, 2015) using an objective procedure. For more detail,
this section is organized in the following subsections: population; sampling and sampling
procedures; procedures for recruitment, participation, and data collection; archival data;
and instrumentation and operationalization of constructs.
Population
The study included the 100 largest U.S. companies within each of the business
sectors (educational, financial, informational, insurance, and retail sectors) whether they
experienced DoS attacks between the years of 2000 and 2019 or not. Business sectors and
companies outside of the United States were excluded.
Sampling and Sampling Procedures
Based on Singleton and Straits’ (2017) research approach, I used a systematic
method to gather data on five business sectors from the United States, as categorized by
the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). I compiled a complete
database of DoS attacks focusing on the 100 companies within each of the business
sectors for the specified 19-year period (100 attacks across the 500 sampled
organizations).
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I performed a power analysis for the Kruskal-Wallis tests using G*Power
(McDonald 2014; Perugini, Gallucci, & Costantini, 2018) with f = .25, p =.05, and power
= .80. I performed a second power analysis for the Spearman correlations using
G*Power with f2 = .15, p =.05, power = .80, and number of predictors = 1. The results
indicated that a total sample size across the five groups should be at least 200 for the
Kruskal-Wallis tests s and fewer would be required for the correlations. By including
100 companies in each sector, the total sample size was 500. This suggests that the
sample size had a greater than 80% chance of finding significant differences across
sectors and relationships between financial variables and duration and financial damages
if they exist in the larger population.
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection
Archival documents refer to existing data recorded or reported information that
gives researchers valuable sources of measurement (Singleton & Straits, 2017). This
archival data collection includes: DoS attacks from government and business reports and
assets and revenues from business report database for the years 2000–2019. I used and
evaluated the Information on DoS attacks from Symantec and McAfee monitoring
research databases. Retrieving data sets from online archives and government reports
involved key word searches using terms such as cyber-attack, network attack, security
breach, hacker, and DoS attacks. The study involved gathering archival documents,
studies, and record and incident reports and interpreting them into categories for the five
business sector types.
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The data included the following information: (a) DoS attacks, (b) types (names)
of targeted business sectors, (c) year of attack, (d) financial loss/damages, (e) business
assets and revenues of attacked business, and (f) duration of attacks. See Table 1 for a
listing of the data that were compiled to answer each research question along with the
sources for the data. I used these data (business sector types, value of assets and revenue
of businesses at the period of the attacks) as the independent variables for this research.
Asset includes any values owned by business, and revenue is total income of a business
sector over a specific period or year. For the purpose of the correlation analyses, assets
and revenues were operationalized as the assets and revenues for the company as reported
the year of the attack.
Data extraction involved using the TextEdit application or Microsoft Excel. After
extracting the data for each year into text format, I uploaded data categorized by financial
loss due to DoS attacks, sector types, assets, revenues, duration of attack and year into the
SPSS version 24 system. This procedure was repeated for each year of the data set and
aggregated across the 19 years included in this study, and I examined whether the data
correctly fit to the research questions. To avoid bias while extracting information from
books, articles, and reports, the researcher employed strategies such as examining source
integrity and reliability. Table 1 includes a summary of the data required to answer each
of the research questions and the databases from which data were extracted.
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Table 1
Data Types and Sources
Research Question

Data

Data Sources

RQ1: Between 2000–2019,
were there significant
differences among business
sectors in the rate of DoS
attacks?

Rate of DoS attacks on each
of 100 companies in each
industry in the 19-year
period.
Business sector type
(educational, financial,
informational, insurance,
and retail)

Arbor network, Norton report, McAFee report,
NAICS, Privacyrights.org, Idtheftcenter.org, IC3,
Avtest.org, FBI websites, and Library of
Congress, U.S. Department of Justice, Carnegie
Mellon, Computer Security Institute, university
libraries, Internet, Homeland security, NSA, and
journals.

RQ2: Between 2000–2019,
were there significant
differences among business
sectors in the duration of DoS
attacks?

Duration of DoS attacks in
19-year period.
Business sector type
(educational, financial,
informational, insurance,
and retail)

Arbor network, Norton report, McAFee report,
NAICS, Privacyrights.org, Idtheftcenter.org, IC3,
Avtest.org, FBI websites, and Library of
Congress, U.S. Department of Justice, Carnegie
Mellon, Computer Security Institute, university
libraries, Internet, Homeland security, NSA, and
journals.

RQ3: Between 2000–2019,
were there significant
differences among business
sectors in the financial damage
per DoS attack?

Financial damage resulting
from DoS attacks in 19-year
period.
Business sector type
(educational, financial,
informational, insurance,
and retail)

RQ4: Between 2000–2019,
within sectors, were there
significant relationships
between company assets
and/or revenues and duration
of DoS attacks?

Duration of DoS attacks in
19-year period.
Business sector type.
Company assets and
revenues.

Journal of Business & Economic Statistics,
Bureau of labor statistics, Arbor network, Norton
report, McAFee report, NAICS, Privacyrights.org,
Idtheftcenter.org, IC3, Avtest.org, FBI websites,
and Library of Congress, U.S. Department of
Justice, Carnegie Mellon, Computer Security
Institute, university libraries, Internet, Homeland
security, NSA, and journals.
Journal of Business & Economic Statistics,
Bureau of labor statistics, Arbor network, Norton
report, McAFee report, NAICS, Privacyrights.org,
Idtheftcenter.org, IC3, Avtest.org, FBI websites,
and Library of Congress, U.S. Department of
Justice, Carnegie Mellon, Computer Security
Institute, university libraries, Internet, Homeland
security, NSA, and journals.

RQ5: Between 2000–2019,
within sectors, were there
significant relationships
between company assets
and/or revenues and the
financial damage resulting
from DoS attacks?

Financial damage resulting
from DoS attacks in 19-year
period.
Business sector type.
Company assets and
revenues.

Journal of Business & Economic Statistics,
Bureau of labor statistics, Arbor network, Norton
report, McAFee report, NAICS, Privacyrights.org,
Idtheftcenter.org, IC3, Avtest.org, FBI websites,
and Library of Congress, U.S. Department of
Justice, Carnegie Mellon, Computer Security
Institute, university libraries, Internet, Homeland
security, NSA, and journals.
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Archival Data
I only used secondary data to answer the research questions. As the original data
collection process is separated from me, my aims and views cannot distort the collected
data. Data are less likely to be influenced by preconceived notions. Instead, when
compiling archival data, researchers must ensure completeness, accuracy, accessibility of
reliable measurements, and in cases of quantitative studies such as this one,
appropriateness of statistical techniques to analyze the compiled data.
Archival/available data studies compile data from a variety of different types of
documents (Moore, Salter, Stanley, & Tamboukou, 2017). These available data include
public and private documents and incident reports. Compared with a survey study,
creating an archival dataset has the advantage of increased accuracy. Business leaders can
omit valuable information when responding to surveys for fear of losing customer trust
and potential client investments (White, 2016). Archival research reduces the likelihood
such omissions because it relies on data that were submitted to the federal government,
for which there are serious legal consequences to falsification or omission. Every method
of data collection has drawbacks and there are several advantages and problems related to
the use of available data (Singleton & Straits, 2017). For example, in cases where the
response rate is poor and past events need reexamining, using existing archival data
appears to be the most viable option for researchers. To avoid any shortcomings and to
maintain reliability and validity, I compared across data sources to confirm the integrity
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of the available data. I checked the compiled data for accuracy by visually inspecting data
and checking invalid and missing data against the original archival data.
DoS attack reports on business sectors come from databases of government
agencies (FBI, Homeland Security), private companies, and the Internet. Both
government and organizational databases are public domain resources, and no special
permissions are required for acquisition of such data. I verified (cross-checking,
evaluating) Internet sites and determined whether the information was from legitimate
government, organizations, businesses, and institutions sources.
Instrumentation and Operationalization of Constructs
Instruments are often used in the data collection procedure as a means of
measuring research variables (Singleton & Straits, 2017). However, I did not include any
surveys or similar instruments because archival data were used.
In this quantitative study, I employ operationalization as defined by Singleton and
Straits (2017) as the means of defining variables into testable and measurable elements.
To ensure reliability, I inspected the study to retest the congruency between the
operational definition and the research questions. I used Kruskal-Wallis tests to determine
whether there are significant differences across sectors on: rate of attacks, duration of
attacks, and financial damages resulting from attacks. I also used four Spearman
correlation analyses to determine whether there is a relationship within a given sector
between a company’s assets and/or revenues and the duration of attacks as well as the
financial damages resulting from attacks.
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Operationalization of Independent and Dependent Variables
Rate of DoS attacks. Rate is operationalized as the average number of attacks per
company in each industry. For the purpose of this study, because it would be nearly
impossible to come up with a credible total number of companies in the retail industry,
for example, I examined the 100 companies (as measured by total workforce) in each of
the five sectors and “rate” referred to the average number attacks on those 100 companies
in the time period under consideration.
Duration of DoS attack. Duration was operationalized as the hours and minutes
that a DoS takes the system offline (block the communication) and that can be enough to
inflict damage at the target site (NSFOCUS, 2017).
Financial damage. Damage refers a negative effect on the asset values by
denying services and it includes tangible losses, lost revenue, and other types of damages
(Palekiene et al., 2014). For this study damages were operationalized as the
monetary value of losses caused by DoS online business interruption.
Sector. Five business sectors were included in this analysis: educational,
financial, informational, insurance, and retail.
Asset. An asset is everything of monetary value retained by a business that is
grouped as capital/fixed, current, tangible or intangible and stated in terms of their cash
value on financial accounts (The Farlex Financial Dictionary, 2017).
Revenue. Revenue is the total amount of income that a business sector generated
from sale of goods and services during a specific period or the amount, in monetary unit,
received during in a given time (Carcello, 2008).
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Data Analysis Plan
Scholars conduct both primary and secondary research. Secondary research
depends on existing data sources collected by others for various objectives (Anderson &
Paterson, 2015). I used two analytical methods to test the hypotheses about cyber-security
attacks with DoS. In the first analysis, I tested differences across sectors in DoS attack
rates, duration of attacks, and financial damages resulting from the attacks for the period
from 2000 to 2019. The second phase of analysis included determining whether there was
a statistically significant relationship between company assets and/or revenues and
duration of DoS attacks and the financial damage resulting from DoS attacks within the
period from 2000 to 2019. Table 2 includes the data analysis plan, indicating the
dependent and independent variables for each research question as well as the statistical
technique that was used to test each hypothesis.
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Table 2
Summary of Data Analysis Approach Per Research Question
Research Questions

Independent
Variable(s)
Business sector type
(educational,
financial,
informational,
insurance, and
retail)

Dependent Variable(s)

RQ2: Between 2000–
2019, were there
significant differences
among business sectors
in the duration of DoS
attacks?

Business sector

Duration of DoS
attacks from
databases tracking
number of attacks in
relation to value of
assets held per
employee within each
sector (IV)

RQ3: Between 2000–
2019, were there
significant differences
among business sectors
in the financial damage
per DoS attack?

Business sector

Financial damages from
DoS attacks from
databases tracking
number of attacks in
relation to revenue at the
time of the attack (IV)

RQ4: Between 2000–
2019, within sectors,
were there significant
relationships between
company assets and/or
revenues and duration
of DoS attacks?

Business sector

RQ5: Between 2000–
2019, within sectors,
were there significant
relationships between
company assets and/or
revenues and the
financial damage
resulting from DoS
attacks?

Business sector

RQ1: Between 2000–
2019, were there
significant differences
among business sectors
in the rate of DoS
attacks?

Value of assets
Revenue of
businesses at the
period of attacks

Value of assets
Revenue of
businesses at the
period of attacks

Rate of DoS attacks
from databases (IC3,
FBI, The U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics and
U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis,
journals) tracking
number of attacks in
each sector type

Analysis
Kruskal-Wallis tests with
4 categories (insurance
excluded) and rate of DoS
attacks on each company
as DV.

Financial damages due to
DoS attacks.

Kruskal-Wallis tests with 4
categories (insurance
excluded) and Duration of
DoS attacks as DV

Kruskal-Wallis tests with 4
categories (insurance
excluded) and Financial
Damages resulting from DoS
attacks as DV
Eight Spearman rank-order
correlations (rs), two for each
sector (insurance excluded),
Value of Assets and Revenues
as IVs and Duration of attack
as DV.)

Eight Spearman rank-order
correlations (rs), two for each
sector (insurance excluded)
Value of Assets and Revenues
as IVs and financial damage
resulting from attack as DV.
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Kruskal-Wallis Test
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) is an analysis used to evaluate statistical
differences. This study originally planned to use ANOVA to determine which of the
differences among the variables were significant. Using this test allows a researcher to
test whether means are statistically different from each other. The closer in value the
means are, the more likely the assumption of equal means will be true when conducting
the test. However, there was a lack of normal distribution across business sectors. Thus,
for the first, second, and third research questions, I used the Kruskal-Wallis test, a
nonparametric test that can be used as alternative to the one-way ANOVA when groups
of independent variables are not equal in population. While previous research has
suggested that the financial services sector might be more subject to DoS attacks (Tariq,
2018), I used the post hoc tests to looks at all possible differences among the five sectors.
Researchers (DePoy & Gitlin, 2011; Hinton, McMurray, & Brownlow, 2014) use
an error bar plot prior to the independent sample test as a preliminary determination of
whether there is no difference in the means and variances between the groups. The x axis
represents the sectors (educational, financial, informational, insurance, and retail), and
the y axis represents the mean value of the dependent variable. In each error bar, the dot
represents the mean of the group. Reading the mean involves placing a horizontal line
across to the left to the y axis and reading the value for that group. The vertical distance
between the two horizontal lines in each error bar is the variance (Carter & Lubinsky,
2016).
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Kruskal-Wallis test is used to identify whether there are statistically significant
differences among independent and dependent variables. Kruskal-Wallis H test is a
nonparametric test that is used to determine significant differences on continuous
dependent variable by categorizing independent variable when the requirements are not
met for one -way ANOVAs.
Kruskal-Wallis assumption of variance indicate whether the difference in the level
of variance between the two groups is significant using an H test. In addition, each
dependent variable was examined for violations of normality and outliers. Normality was
evaluated by measuring skewness and kurtosis for each quantitative variable. Violations
of normality were corrected, through a transformation of the nonnormal variable and/or
by removing outliers from the data base. Testing the hypotheses involves using a p < .05
level of significance (Neuman, 2011).
For Research Question 1, Research Question 2, and Research Question 3, the
independent variable was business sector (educational, financial, informational,
insurance, and retail). The dependent variables were rate of DoS target attacks for the
period from 2000-2019, the duration of the attacks, and the financial damages resulting
from these attacks. Tajalizadehkhoob et al. (2014) and Tariq (2018) demonstrated some
businesses are more attractive for DoS attack actors than others. For example, gathering
data from secondary sources from the period of 2010-2018 and utilizing descriptive
statistics, Tariq indicated that financial services were targeted with DoS attacks more
than other institutions. Adebiaye, Alryalat, and Owusu (2016) examined financial
damages from cyber-crime, using financial losses as a dependent variable and cybercrime
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as an independent variable. This study adds to the existing research by examining
differences of rates, duration, and financial damages of DoS attacks over a 19-year period
among the business sectors.
Correlation
Correlation analysis distinguishes which variables impact the dependent variable
of interest and examines how well a model predicts a dependent variable. It is used to
identify the relationship between a dependent and one or more independent variables and
explore the forms of these relationships (Singleton & Straits, 2017). The study analyzed
the hypotheses for Research Questions 4 and 5 using correlation analysis (Spearman’s
correlational coefficient). Spearman’s correlational analysis measures the degree of
relationship between variables.
I tested these relationships for each business sector: educational, financial,
informational, and retail. Insurance was included in the overall correlations, but a
separate correlation for insurance could not be calculated because there were only two
cases of DoS attacks on insurance companies. Testing the strength and direction of the
relationship took place at an a < .05 level of significance. A p value of p < .05 indicates
that the researcher can reject the null hypothesis.
Research Questions 4 and 5 consider whether a target’s financial value was a
factor in making companies suitable and attractive targets for motivated attackers. In
other words, did having high values of assets and high-generated revenues make certain
companies more attractive to attackers and, therefore, more likely to be targeted with
long attacks that result in financial damages?
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Tajalizadehkhoob et al. (2014) used RAT to examine four aspects that drive target
selection attacks: value, portability, visibility, and accessibility. Their research questions
included whether the high values (richness) of the sector attracted more companies to be
targeted by attack. They employed regression analysis and Spearman’s correlational test
to determine metrics for per week attacks; also, they calculated the average of the attacks
from a ranked database to evaluate how the intensity of attacks related to size.
The right type of correlation depends upon the quantity of data. While Pearson’s
correlation is used for parametric tests, Spearman correlation is used for nonparametric
tests. Spearman correlation tests measure continuous variables that have failed the
assumption of the Pearson correlations. I used Spearman rank correlation statistically to
measure the strength and directions of nonparametric relationships among data. The rs
and significance (p) values indicate the effect of a variable.
Threat to Validity
While qualitative researchers ensure the integrity of their research by
implementing measures to ensure study credibility and transferability, quantitative
researchers focus on a study’s internal and external validity as key measures of research
quality (Nowell, Norris, White, & Moules, 2017; Singleton & Straits, 2017). Employing
quantitative measures of validity is a significant factor for researchers as their
engagements help to make certain academic value, meaningful, precise, and properly
constructed studies. Although scholars may use various definitions to assess the validity
of their research, essentially, validity relates to the overall accuracy and creditability of a
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study (Singleton & Straits, 2017). In this study, validity serves to ensure the rigor of
procedures and processes to ensure and minimize errors or discrepancies in this work.
To help achieve reliability in this work, I explained and described every essential
detail of the inquiry. Issues related to validity might affect the outcome of research results
or quality of a study. Research results may have internal, external, and/or construct
validity. Internal validity refers to the researcher’s ability to form inferences (Sikorskii &
Noble, 2013) or to legitimately, effectively, and accurately measure what they intend to
measure. On the other hand, external validity rerefers to my ability to generalize or apply
findings and results to larger populations, groups, or other settings (Singleton & Straits,
2017).
In this research, the greatest threat to validity in utilizing and transferring data
from one database to another was human entry errors. While there is nothing that could
be done to validate original reports’ correctness by the companies, validity of transferring
this data into an Excel spreadsheet and later an SPSS database for analysis was ensured
through a repeated data collection and comparison process. The primary drawback is that
the previous research data may not have been collected to the researcher’s standard; this
researcher has no control over how the data were reposted and collected when using
archived information. The data may be inaccurate or may possibly fail to address certain
issues. Further, publicly available datasets were used to identify the amount of financial
damage and the likely duration of attacks. The archival data might not generalize to other
industries or business sectors in other countries.
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The issue of validity could affect the result of the research. According to Lakshmi
and Mohideen (2013), the study upshots may encompass one of the validities (internal or
external). Through the association of validity and reliability, the researcher reduced
biases and enhanced the research accuracy by using Singleton and Strait’s (2017) and
Neuman’s (2011) methods and by double checking the archival data and evaluation
techniques. Additional analysis of the data sampling frames and methods and research
dealing with the accuracy of the statistics appears in Chapter 4.
External Validity
In a quantitative study, threats to external validity are any elements within the
research that lessens the generalizability. As the external validity is the extent to which
the outcome of a research can be generalized (Avellar et al., 2016), it is important to state
that all obtainable data were gathered to address the research questions. To protect their
confidentiality, some companies targeted by attacks may have been unwilling to report all
types of cyber-attacks. Unreported incident variable might be significant for analysis.
Targeted attacked data is limited only to United States companies, which limits the
generalizability of the data. The validation procedure included collecting and analyzing
data to evaluate the correctness of a method. Achieving external validity for outcomes
that may not be generalizable to other situations with various company levels is
challenging. Balancing conflicting and dynamic occurrences within the data set is also
difficult. Thus, using multiple types of analyses to examine the same data and eliminate
all threats to external validity that intermingle with independent valuables may have
strengthened the study.
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Internal Validity
An internal threat to validity is the process of archival data collection methods
and ensuring its validity. This study was designed to remove the possibility that variables
other than any independent variables alter dependent variables. As internal validity is a
means to evaluate if research is complete, an appropriate measure was taken to avoid
confounding variables (Avellar et al., 2016).
The goal of this study was to systematically analyze the data and correctly move
from measurements to conclusions. Internal validity refers to a researcher’s ability to
effectively and precisely measure what they anticipated to measure. Internal validity
associates to the congruency of research results (Singleton & Straits, 2017). Use of
archival data sets can provide some significant benefits to reduce threats to internal
validity. In this study, the researcher managed threats to internal validity by relying on a
governmental database for data collection that was appropriate for evaluating and
examining DoS attacks. Due to varying U.S. states’ reporting and disclosure laws, there
is no single repository that includes comprehensive information about all DoS attacks,
damages, and durations. I employed ex post facto research, which is a type of
nonexperimental research in which there is no ability to control for extraneous
variables as the research happens after the fact. I determined whether the duration of
DoS attacks is strongly correlated with higher business values (assets and revenues)
and whether the financial damages from attacks is strongly correlated with higher
business values (assets and revenues). I addressed the limitations of ex post facto and
correlational research in terms of the inability to measure or infer causality from
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statistical association or differences and the inability to control for extraneous variables
that may contribute to the relationships or comparisons of interest. Greater effort was
given to double checking to exclude extraneous variables such as selection, history, and
selection-maturation in this study.
Construct Validity
Threat to construct validity can occur from the selection of independent variables
and the choice of dependent variables. As construct validity is the most multifaceted and
complex, statistical data analysis techniques were designed to measure the data in relation
to the research questions as they were intended to be measured (Singleton & Straits,
2017). Construct validity has been the center of theoretical and empirical consideration in
several fields of studies (Singleton & Straits, 2017). Researchers use construct validity to
examine correlations between an intended measure of a construct and other measures that
must be theoretically aligned. To simplify the account construct validity ascertained by
using delineations and measurement processes for selected variables, ensuring internal
validity requires extraneous variables to need be controlled and confound variable be
excluded.
Ethical Procedures
Ethical research requires the pursuit of the overall principles of scientific research
(Singleton & Straits, 2017); as such, this research project adhered to Walden University’s
Institutional Review Board (IRB) parameters. Accessing the existing data online does not
require consent from the owner of the selected data. All secondary data from CSI,
Privacyrights.org, FBI Incident/Crime Reports, and other databases are public domain.
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The compiled data on targeted business sectors with DoS attack are from the public
domain. This research does not include personal identifiers to identify individuals. An
online available dataset does not require preexisting arrangement with the data originator
to provide secure mechanism for data usage. Resource interpretation is bounded by the
study. I conducted a comprehensive literature review to show that the archival data that
are publicly accessible have not already been analyzed.
Summary
This chapter included a discussion of the components of compiling and analyzing
the data for this DoS attack study. This chapter included information on the quantitative
design and research convention. I demonstrated that a quantitative approach produced the
best and most accurate data for a study on DoS attacks. The focus of this section was on
describing the procedural phases that took place in the study. Using multiple analysis
methods resolved the issues of validity and reliability and helped maintain the quality of
research. The chapter included a discussion on the collection and analysis methods of
archival data on DoS attacks and an arrangement for selecting companies. The aim of
using companies as the unit of analysis was to present findings that are valuable to
organizational leaders in comparing, measuring, and evaluating their targeted values and
strengthening their defense systems. Chapter 4 presents the result of this study.
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Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
The purpose of this quantitative study was to examine differences in rates and
severity (in terms of duration of attacks and financial damages resulting from attacks) of
DoS attacks across business sectors (RQ1, RQ2, RQ3) and to determine the relationship
between a company’s assets and/or revenues and duration of the attack (RQ4) and the
relationship between a company’s assets and/or revenues and the financial damages from
an attack (RQ5). I implemented a quantitative, nonexperimental research design using
archival data from 100 companies to answer the guiding research questions. To examine
the first three research questions, I studied the overall differences across sectors in the
attack rates, attack duration, and financial damages resulting from DoS attacks. To
examine the remaining two research questions for this study, I studied the relationship
between company assets/revenues and the duration of attacks as well as the relationship
between company assets/revenues and the financial damages resulting from DoS attacks.
I used an ex post facto data search to develop the dataset. To perform the analysis, I
compiled the data on DoS attacks from websites, journals, and books in the form of an
Excel text file and imported the Excel text file into SPSS.
I applied two analytical techniques for this study to test the hypotheses. To test
the first three hypotheses, I examined the differences among sectors (independent
variable) in the rate of, duration of, and financial loss from DoS attacks (dependent
variables). The proposal called for using 1-way ANOVAs to answer these research
questions. As part of ANOVA testing, it was found that the data violated the assumption
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of normality; therefore, Kruskal-Wallis tests, a nonparametric alternative to ANOVA,
were substituted. To test the other hypotheses, I examined the relationship between the
dependent variables and company assets and/or revenues using correlation analysis.
Because these questions also employed data that violated the assumption of normality,
Spearman rank-order correlation was substituted for Pearson product-moment
correlation.
For this study, I examined five research questions and hypotheses. For the first
and the second research questions, I examined the differences in the rate and duration of
DoS attacks among five business sectors, in the aggregate from the period 2000–2019.
For the third research question, I examined the differences in the financial damage
resulting from DoS attacks across the five business sectors from the period 2000–2019.
For the fourth and fifth research questions, I examined the relationships between the
duration of DOS attacks and financial damages resulting from DoS attacks from the
period 2000–2019 and the value of assets held and revenues generated by the business. In
this chapter, I describe the data collection process, discusses discrepancies in this process
compared to what was described in Chapter 3, and includes a discussion of the research
findings for each of the research questions. Chapter 4 concludes with a summary of the
results.
Data Collection
According to Irwin (2013), there is an increasing trend towards the use of
secondary analysis. This study follows suit in that it is based on analyzing existing
archival data, collection methods, and analysis techniques. I compiled the existing data
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from archival datasets that included a total of 100 business/organization sectors that were
attacked between 2000 and 2019, a period of 19 years. As shown in Table 3, the attacked
companies were from the following sectors: educational (9%), financial (38%),
informational (37%), insurance (2%), and retail (14%). Of the total 100 businesses, the
majority were from the financial and informational sectors, and the fewest were from the
insurance sector. All organizations were from the United States and were among the 100
firms from each sector. There were some necessary discrepancies in data collection
compared to the plan presented in Chapter 3, specifically in the process of data collection
it became apparent that some business sectors did not report/publish their data.
Additionally, some resources had conflicting data and sporadic website outages reports. I
recognize that too much missing data is problematic and can lead to bias; in order to
minimize the loss of cases due to missing data, I utilized pair-wise rather than list-wise
deletion. To reduce the missing data on financial loss, I calculated a few companies’
revenues based on their yearly generated revenues.
Table 3
Number of Attacks on the 100 Companies in Each Sector
Sector
Educational
Financial
Informational
Insurance
Retail
Total

Attacks
9
38
37
2
14
100
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Study Results
I utilized secondary data for both the independent and dependent variables. For
this study, I used G*Power analysis. I examined 500 companies—100 from each sector,
resulting in a dataset of 100 attacked companies and 400 companies that were not
attacked. Finally, I applied convenience sampling to choose companies from each sector.
Descriptive Data
Table 4 presents the descriptive data for the five dependent variables. The most
important values in this table are the skew and kurtosis numbers. For all five variables,
the skew and kurtosis values are well outside the normal range, indicating that the
variables are not normally distributed. As a result, I used the Kruskal-Wallis test, which
is the non-parametric equivalent of ANOVA, and Spearman correlations, the nonparametric equivalent of Pearson correlations, throughout the analyses
Table 4
Descriptive Statistics for the Dependent Variables

Cases
Duration
Assets
Revenues
Fin. Damage

Mean
0.2
284.78
284.78
15.21
$9,964,454

Cases
Duration
Assets
Revenues
Fin. Damage

Kurtosis
5.68
9.3
9.3
54.69
31

Std. Error
0.02
38.67
38.67
4.59
$3,403,268

Median
0
180
180
2.29
$614,386

Skewness
Range
2.33
3
2.82
2,155.00
2.82
2,155.00
6.76
404.25
5 $240,000,000

Mode
0
60
60
0.08
$100,000

Std. Dev.
0.45
376.87
376.87
45.67
$32,995,912

Min.
Max.
0
3
5
2,160.00
5
2,160.00
0
404.25
0 $240,000,000
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Kruskal-Wallis Analysis: RQs 1, 2, and 3
I examined companies with one or more attacks in comparison to companies with
no attacks. I used Kruskal-Wallis to test the null hypothesis for RQ1. Because there were
only two insurance companies attacked, I conducted the analysis without the insurance
sector.
Based on the work of Levene (1960) and Derrick et al. (2018), I rejected the null
when the p-value was smaller than the alpha level. Kruskal-Wallis uses a two-tailed test
to determine whether or not the means or counts are significantly different across sectors
(Snedecor & Cochran, 1983). I used an alpha level of .05 for the tests.
RQ1: Between 2000–2019, were there significant differences among business
sectors in the rate of DoS attacks?
To examine Research Question 1, I conducted a Kruskal-Wallis test to assess if
there was a significant difference among business sectors in the rate of attacks between
2000 and 2019. Kruskal-Wallis requires at least five observations in each cell and so the
insurance sector could not be included. There is a statistically significant difference in the
mean rank of attacks among business sectors.
With insurance excluded, the overall differences among sectors were significant
(H (3,400) =39.22, p<.001). The Dunn post hoc comparisons indicated that the financial
and informational sectors are significantly higher in the rate of attacks than the
educational sector and retail sector. The significance levels for each pairwise comparison
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appear in Table 6. The null hypothesis is rejected with 95% confidence that the
differences among the various sectors is not due to random chance.
Table 5
The Rate of Attacks
SUMMARY
Count
Educational
100
Financial
100
Informational
100
Retail
100
H (3,400) =39.22, p<.001

Sum
9
38
37
14

Average
0.09
0.38
0.37
0.14

Table 6
Kruskal-Wallis Rate of Attacks (Dunn Contrasts, Pairwise p Values.)

Financial
Informational
Retail

Educational
p<.001
p<.001
p=.768

Financial

Information

p=.768
p<.001

p<.001

RQ2: Between 2000–2019, were there significant differences among business
sectors in the duration of DoS attacks?
To analyze Research Question 2, I performed a Kruskal-Wallis test to assess if
there were differences among business sectors in the duration of attacks (Table 7).
Kruskal-Wallis requires at least five observations in each cell; therefore, I could not
include the insurance. Excluding the insurance sector, there is a statistically significant
difference among business sectors in duration of attacks (H(3,98)=10.69, p = 0.014).
Dunn post hoc contrasts p values for pairwise comparisons appear as Table 8 and indicate
that the duration of attacks was significantly higher for the educational and informational
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sectors than for the retail sector or financial sector. The other differences were not
significant due to the small sample size. The average duration for the educational sector
was 621 minutes while the average duration for the financial sector was 175.42 minutes,
and the informational sector and the retail sector had averages of 357.54 minutes and
286.43 minutes respectively. The null hypothesis is rejected with 95% confidence that the
variance between the various sectors is not due to random chance. It would be justifiable
to conclude that durations are significantly longer for educational and informational
companies than for financial and retail companies.
Table 7
Duration
Groups

Count

Educational
Financial
Informational
Retail
H(3,98)=10.69, p = 0.014

Sum
5589
6666
13229
4010

9
38
37
14

Average
621.00
175.42
357.54
286.43

Table 8
Kruskal-Wallis Duration of Attacks (Dunn Contrasts, Pairwise p Values.)

Financial
Informational
Retail

Educational
p=.171
p=1
p=1

Financial

Informational

p=.027
p<.001

p=1

RQ3: Between 2000–2019, were there significant differences among business
sectors in the financial damage per DoS attack?
To analyze RQ3, I performed a Kruskal-Wallis test to assess if there were
differences among business sectors in financial loss resulting from attacks (Table 9).
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Kruskal-Wallis requires at least five observations in each cell; therefore, I omitted the
insurance sector. There is a statistically significant difference among business sectors, as
determined by Kruskal-Wallis tests (H(3,92)=20.34, p = .00014). The average financial
loss for each sector was as follows: the educational sector average loss was $379,828.9;
the financial sector average loss was $2,183,218; the informational sector average loss
was $12,046,218, and the retail sector average loss was $28,530,387. I rejected the null
hypothesis with 95% confidence that the various sectors' differences are not due to
random chance. Financial damages for informational and retail companies were higher
than for educational and financial companies. Dunn post hoc contrasts p values for
pairwise comparisons appear in Table 10 and indicate that the educational sector's
financial loss was significantly lower than the financial sector, informational sector, or
retail sector. In addition, the loss for the retail sector was higher than the loss for the
financial sector.

123

Table 9
Financial Loss
Groups
Count
Sum
Average
Educational
8
3038631.2
379828.9
Financial
37 80779073.75 2183218.209
Informational
34 409571428.8 12046218.49
Retail
13 370895025.3 28530386.56
H(3,92)=20.34, p = .00014

Table 10
Kruskal-Wallis Financial Loss (Dunn Contrasts, Pairwise p Values.)

Financial
Informational
Retail

Educational
p=.029
p=<.001
P<.001

Financial

Informational

p=.082
p<.006

p=.163

Correlational Analyses: RQs 4 and 5
I used Correlation analysis for RQs 4 and 5 to measure the degree of a
relationship between independent and dependent variables and predict the value of the
variable and how one variable affects another (Ciaburro, 2018). I used Spearman Rankorder correlation analysis rather than Pearson product-moment correlation to identify the
relationship's strength or the absence of a relationship between independent and
dependent variables (Ciaburro, 2018) as the variables displayed a non-normal
distribution. To consider the relationship between asset/revenue and duration (RQ4) and
asset/revenue and financial damage (RQ5), I first ran Spearman correlations to determine
if the sector's asset/revenue correlated to its duration of the attack. Based on this test, I

124
found that asset/revenue correlates to the sector's financial damage because of DoS
attacks. I tested relationships for each of four business sectors: educational, financial,
informational, and retail (excluding insurance because there were only two cases).
Testing the strength and direction of the relationship took place at an a < .05 level of
significance. A p-value of p < .05 indicated that I can reject the null hypothesis.
RQ4: Between 2000–2019, within sectors, were there significant relationships
between company assets and/or revenues and duration of DoS attacks?
Due to missing data on assets for five businesses (specifically one from
educational and four from the informational sector), the dataset for Research Question 4
included a total of 95 businesses that had been attacked.
To answer Research Question 4, I had to decide if there was a relationship
between the assets/revenues and duration of attack. Table 11 shows the results of the
correlation for the duration by assets. The negative coefficient (-.247) means that higher
assets correspond to lower duration. The correlation across all sectors is significant as
p=.016, meaning that the relationship between assets and duration is significant across
sectors. Spearman Correlation Analysis was used to measure the degree of a relationship
between assets and duration of attacks. The Coefficient ranges from +1 to -1, with +1
representing a positive correlation and -1 representing a negative correlation. One
company from the educational sector had missing data in financial damage and four
companies from the informational sector had missing data in the asset and revenue
variables. Across all sectors, there is a significant negative correlation between duration
and assets. (rs=-.247, p=.016). Within sectors, there is a significant positive correlation
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between duration and assets for financial companies (rs=.424, p=.008). The higher the
assets within the financial sector, the longer the duration of attacks.
Table 11
Spearman Correlations: Duration by Assets
Source
N Correlation Significance
Financial
38 .424
.008
Informational
32 .245
.176
Retail
14 -.024
.933
Educational
9 .427
.252
All Companies
95 -.247
.016
Note: No analysis was done for Insurance (N=2).
The relation between duration and revenue is negative, meaning that when the
revenue is higher, the duration of attacks tends to decrease (rs=-.162, p=.108) (Table 12).
This relationship is not significant; therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. H0:
There wasn’t a significant relationship between company revenues and the duration of
DoS attacks.
For duration by revenue, Spearman Correlation Analysis was used to measure the
degree of a relationship. There was not a significant relationship between duration and
revenue. Retail is highest in correlation (r s-.438), but not significant (p=.072) due to the
small N. The N is low for retail and so even a quite high rs is not significant.
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Table 12
Spearman Correlations: Duration by Revenue
Source
N
Correlation
Significance
Financial
37
-.293
.074
Informational 32
.288
.110
Retail
13
-.438
.072
Educational
8
.240
.535
All
99
-.162
.108
Companies
Note: No analysis was done for Insurance (N=2).
RQ5: Between 2000–2019, within sectors, were there significant relationships
between company assets and/or revenues and the financial damage
resulting from DoS attacks?
The relationship between the financial damage and assets is negative, meaning
that higher assets lead to lower financial damage (Table 13). In addition, the relationship
is not statistically significant (p=.164), indicating that the null hypothesis cannot be
rejected.
Table 13
Correlations: Financial Damage by Assets
Source
N
Correlation Significance
Financial
35
-.070
.673
Informational 32
.423
.016
Retail
13
.269
.374
Educational
9
.237
.538
All
94
.145
.164
Companies
Note: No analysis was done for Insurance (N=2).

The relationship between financial damages and revenues is positive, meaning
that higher revenues indicate higher financial damages (rs=.158). However, the results are
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statistically insignificant (p=.121). The null hypothesis could be accepted. H0: There were
no significant relationships between company revenues and the financial damage of DoS
attacks.
I conducted a Spearman Correlation Analysis of the relationship between
financial damage by revenue of business sectors (Table 12). There was not a significant
correlation between financial damage and revenues.
Table 14
Correlations: Financial Damages by Revenue
Source
N
Correlation
Significance
Financial
37
.072
.668
Informational
31
.200
.273
Retail
12
.114
.623
Educational
7
.110
.777
All Companies
98
.158
.121
Note: No analysis was done for Insurance (N=2).

Summary
The purpose of this chapter was to present the results of the quantitative analyses
used to test each of the research questions and hypotheses generated for this study. Three
of the research questions were analyzed using Kruskal-Wallis analyses to find significant
differences. Spearman correlational analysis was used to examine two of the research
questions. Four research questions denoted statistically significant results. Specifically,
for Research Question 1, the outcome indicated that there is a significant difference in the
rate of attacks between business sectors. The financial and informational sectors are
significantly higher in the rate of attacks than the educational sector and retail sectors.
The alternative hypothesis was accepted and the conclusion to this question showed the
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rate of attacks were different among business sectors. For Research Question 2, the
results revealed that there is a significant difference in the duration of attacks among
business sectors. The duration of attacks was significantly higher for the educational and
informational sectors than for the retail sector or financial sector. For Research Question
3, the results revealed that there is a significant difference in the financial damage of
attacks among business sectors. The educational sector's financial loss was significantly
lower than the financial sector, informational sector, or retail sector. In addition, the loss
for the retail sector was significantly higher than the loss for the financial sector.
In the first, second, and third research questions, the null hypotheses were
rejected. This indicates there are statistically significant differences in the severity of the
DoS attacks regarding rate, duration, and financial damage for educational, financial,
informational, and retail sectors.
The fourth research question involved looking at the correlations of assets and
revenues with duration of attacks. The correlation between assets and duration across all
sectors is negative and significant (rs=-.247, p=.016), meaning lower assets correspond to
greater duration of attacks. Within sectors, there is a significant positive correlation
between duration and assets of financial companies (rs=.424, p=.008). As such, greater
assets correspond to greater duration of DOS attacks for financial companies. There was
not a significant relationship between duration and revenue.
The fifth research question involved examining the correlations of assets and
revenues with financial damages resulting from attacks. There were no significant
relationships between assets or revenues and financial damages.
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In Chapter 4, I included an introduction, description of data collection, report of
data analysis and findings of the study, and the summary of the chapter. Chapter 5
provides an interpretation of the findings presented in this chapter. Chapter 5 also
includes discussion, an elucidation of the limitations of the study, implications, and
recommendations for further research and includes implications for positive social
change. Finally, Chapter 5 includes conclusions of the study.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
In this chapter, I discuss the research findings and offer conclusion and
recommendations based on these findings. As described in Chapter 1, this study
contributes to the theoretical understanding of targeted business sector attacks with DoS,
as existing studies remain limited. At the same time, the advances in Internet technology
over the last several decades have resulted in ever more cyber-security attacks (Harris &
Maymi, 2016; Lee, 2013). Targeted DoS attacks have become more sophisticated and
more challenging to defend against. Existing research has recorded increases in annual
recurring attacks; however, little research has examined the different rates at which
business sectors are targeted with DoS attacks, and, at the time of this study, there are
few or no published research articles on the relationship between the values held and
generated by the business sectors and DoS attacks. The purpose of the study was to fill
the gap in literature by exploring DoS attacks in the U.S. from 2000 to 2019, to identify
significant differences among business sectors in the rate, duration, and financial
damages/loss resulting from DoS attacks, and to examine the relationships between
business sectors’ assets/revenues and attack duration as well as financial damages
resulting from DoS attacks.
My objective was to answer the five research questions. In addition to conducting
quantitative analysis to answer these questions, I used Cohen and Felson’s (1979) RAT
and Cornish and Clarke’s (1987) RCT as theoretical frames for examining the data in
relation to the research questions. These theoretical models have been valuable in
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analyzing the attractiveness of particular business sector types and business values, which
could make them more likely to be targeted.
The results of the study indicated there is a significant difference among business
sectors in the rate of DoS attacks, in the duration of attacks, and in financial damages, as
determined by Kruskal-Wallis tests. The Dunn post hoc comparisons indicated that the
financial sector and informational sector are significantly higher in rate of attacks than
the educational sector and retail sector. In addition, the Dunn post hoc comparisons
indicated that the duration of attacks was significantly higher for the educational sector
and informational sector than for the retail sector or financial sector. Financial damages
were significantly higher for the informational and retail sectors than for the educational
or financial sectors. Spearman correlation analysis was used to measure the degree of a
relationship between duration of attacks and financial damages and asset/revenues.
Across all sectors, there is a significant negative correlation between duration of attacks
and company assets. (rs=-.247, p=.016), and within sectors, there is a significant positive
correlation between duration of attacks and assets for financial companies (rs=.424,
p=.008). However, the result indicated no evidence of relationships between revenues and
duration of attacks or asset/revenue and financial damage resulting from attacks.
Interpretation of Findings
I employed quantitative analysis techniques to determine whether there were
significant differences in rate, duration, and damage of attacks among business sectors
and to determine whether there was a relationship between assets/revenues and attack
durations and financial damage resulting from DoS attacks. I designed the quantitative,
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ex post facto study to answer five research questions. This section is organized to present
the findings of each of the research questions in relation to existing literature on DoS
attacks and in relation to the RAT and RCT theoretical foundations that were derived
from prior criminological studies in order to better understand the motivation of
attackers.
Research Question 1
RQ1: Between 2000–2019, were there significant differences among business
sectors in the rate of DoS attacks?
H01: Between 2000–2019, there were no significant differences among business
sectors in the rate of DoS attacks.
Ha1: Between 2000–2019, there were significant differences among business
sectors in the rate of DoS attacks.
The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test indicated the overall differences among
sectors were significant (H (3,400) =39.22, p<.001)). The number of cases was highest in
the financial sector at 38 followed by the informational sector at 37 while retail recorded
only 14 cases. The null hypothesis is rejected with 95% confidence that the differences
among the various sectors is not due to random chance.
With the exception of a few studies (e.g. Bendovschi et al. (2016), Leukfeldt and
Yar (2016), and O’Leary et al. (2017)), there is a gap in the research literature whether
attackers target some business sectors with DoS more than they target others. In this
study, I found that there are statistically significant differences in attack rates among five
business sectors. The results revealed that the financial sector is the preferred choice
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among the five sectors for targeting attackers. This could be attributed to Romanosky
(2016)’s finding that organizations in the financial sector were the most vulnerable to
attacks. Further, Leukfeldt and Yar (2016) found that online financial business sectors’
high visibility plays a role in cyber-crime victimization. The results from this study add
evidence to the existing literature that suggests financial companies are targeted in DoS
attacks.
I interpreted the results from this study according to RAT and RCT theoretical
frameworks, which indicate that because attacks are not distributed equally, attackers are
more inclined to attack specific targets. Specifically, the results suggest there is a higher
motivation for attacks within the financial sector and the informational sector. According
to Décary-Hetú and Dupont (2012), attackers target companies’ defense weaknesses in
software. In other words, an attacker uses Internet opportunity (its remoteness of the
victim) and a lack of cyber security defense in order to target companies. The findings
from this study could be interpreted as evidence that frequent attacks indicate a lack of
security defense, allowing for opportunities for attack, which influence attackers’
decisions and motivations.
Research Question 2
RQ2: Between 2000–2019, were there significant differences among business
sectors in the duration of DoS attacks?
H02: Between 2000–2019, there were no significant differences among business
sectors in the duration of DoS attacks.
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Ha2: Between 2000–2019, there were significant differences among business
sectors in the duration of DoS attacks.
The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test indicated that there is a statistically
significant difference among business sectors in duration of attacks (H(3,98)=10.69), p =
0.014). The duration for the informational and educational sectors were significantly
higher than the duration for financial or retail sectors; however, the other differences
were not significant due to small sample size. The null hypothesis is rejected with 95%
confidence that the variance between the various sectors is not due to random chance.
There is no existing published research on the duration of attacks among business
sectors. As such, the findings from this study work to fill the gap in the research literature
about whether some business sectors are more vulnerable to longer DoS attacks. This
study found that there are statistically significant differences in attack durations. The two
theoretical frames for this study, RAT and RCT, emphasize the role of attackers’ choices
and opportunities when making decisions about whether to attack targets. One
interpretation of the statistically significant differences in duration of attacks among
business sectors is that offenders chose to attack the educational and informational targets
for longer periods. In the case of this finding, the theories might be extended to indicate
that the lack of a capable guardian might lead to longer attacks.
Research Question 3
RQ3: Between 2000–2019, were there significant differences among business
sectors in the financial damage per DoS attack?
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H03: Between 2000–2019, there were no significant differences among business
sectors in the financial damage per DoS attack.
Ha3: Between 2000–2019, there were significant differences among business
sectors in the financial damage per DoS attack.
The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test indicated that there is a statistically
significant difference among business sectors (H(3,100)=18.73, p = .0003). The average
financial loss for the retail sector and informational sector was higher than the average
financial loss for other sectors, and the average financial loss for the educational sector
was significantly lower, likely because educational institutions are not dependent on
online (Internet) business for their revenues (tuition). The null hypothesis is rejected with
95% confidence that the differences among the various sectors are not due to random
chance.
There were an alarming number of DoS attacks aimed at major U.S. business
sectors between 2000-2019. These attacks resulted in financial damages for all types of
businesses, but for specific business sectors the damages were greater. Financial damage
refers to a negative effect on the asset values by denying services through the DoS attack.
As companies are highly dependent on an Internet connection, service interruptions can
interfere with business activities (revenue) and can be devastating to the business.
According to Arora, Dumar, and Sachdeva (2011), the financial impact of attacks can be
devastating to a business, and a few hours of network service interruption can be costly to
a company. Financial damages include tangible losses, lost revenue, and other types of
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damages (Palekiene et al., 2014). For this study, damages were the monetary value of
losses caused by DoS online business interruption.
The results from this study indicated that the retail sector and informational sector
experienced greater financial damages than other sectors. Because retail sectors are often
dependent on online sales, service interruptions are likely to result in significant losses.
The high financial damages caused by attacks could be a motivating factor for attackers.
The findings could also be interpreted as evidence that certain sectors are vulnerable to
financial damage.
Research Question 4
RQ4: Between 2000–2019, within sectors, were there significant relationships
between company assets and/or revenues and duration of DoS attacks?
H04: Between 2000–2019, within sectors, there were no significant relationships
between company assets and/or revenues and the duration of DoS attacks.
Ha4: Between 2000–2019, within sectors, there was a significant relationship
between company assets and the duration of DoS attacks.
Hb4: Between 2000–2019, within sectors, there was a significant relationship
between company revenues and the duration of DoS attacks
The results of the Spearman’s correlation analysis indicated there was a
significant relationship between duration of attacks and assets. The negative coefficient (.247) means that higher assets correspond to lower duration. The correlation across all
sectors is significant as p=.016, meaning that the relationship between assets and duration
is significant across sectors. Within sectors, there is a significant positive correlation
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between duration and assets for financial companies (rs=.424, p=.008); the higher the
assets within the financial sector, the longer the duration of attacks.
The relation between duration and revenue is negative, meaning that when the
revenue is higher the duration of attacks tends to decrease (rs=-.162, p=.108) (Table 9).
This relationship is not significant and the null hypothesis can be accepted.
As businesses or industries are categorized according to the type of their
economic activities, assets and revenues are fundamental elements of business sectors.
Assets are resources with economic value that the business owns and that are recorded in
companies’ balance sheets (Siegel, Dauber, & Shim, 2005). In relation to this study,
Leukfeldt and Yar (2016) noticed that value has a financial character and cyber-attackers
are interested in assigned value. The concept of a suitable target in RAT is a combination
of value and opportunity
According to Cohen and Felson (1979) and Cornish and Clarke (1986), (the
founders of the research theories RAT and RCT), attackers make a choice to commit a
crime based on opportunity, a lack of guardian, motivation, and attractiveness of the
targets. Within the financial sector, there is a significant positive correlation between
duration of attacks and company assets. The relation indicates that businesses with higher
assets in the financial sector were the target of longer attacks, which is likely based on the
attractiveness of the target and the opportunity to attack. In other words, the higher the
value of the company within the financial sector, the higher the motivation of attackers.
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Research Questions 5
RQ5: Between 2000–2019, within sectors, were there significant relationships
between company assets and/or revenues and the financial damage resulting from
DoS attacks?
H05: Between 2000–2019, within sectors, there were no significant relationships
between company assets and/or revenues and the financial damage of DoS
attacks.
Ha5: Between 2000–2019, within sectors, there was a significant relationship
between company assets and the financial damage resulting from DoS attacks.
Hb5: Between 2000–2019, within sectors, there was a significant relationship
between company revenues and the financial damage resulting from DoS attacks.
The results of the Spearman’s correlational analysis indicated that the relationship
between financial damages and company assets is negative, meaning that higher assets
indicate lower financial damages (Table 13). However, the relationship is not statistically
significant (p=.164); therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.
The relationship between financial damages and company revenues is positive,
meaning that higher revenues indicate higher financial damages (rs=.158). However, the
results are statistically insignificant (p=.121). The null hypothesis can be accepted.
Previous published research has not focused on revenues and assets aside from
confirming that DoS attacks lead to a loss of profits (Anderson et al., 2013). Researchers
have not investigated the role of financial metrics in determining business sectors and
target candidates for cyber-attack. Tajalizadehkhoob et al. (2014) drew upon RAT to
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describe why criminals go after a certain target and examined DoS attacks through the
lens of the economics of crime, but they did not categorize targets by assets or revenues.
Based on the findings from this study, I could not reject the null hypotheses in
relation to assets/revenue and financial damage. However, research that focuses on
business sector attractiveness and targets, damages, and sector types are valuable to
creating financial metrics that can help predict the likelihood for attacks.
According to RAT and RCT, attackers make choices to attack based on target
attractiveness and opportunity, and they rationally consider the positive or negative
valuation of potential attack results. Taken together, the results from this study suggest
that DoS attack rates are higher in the financial sector and that financial companies with
higher assets experience attacks of a longer duration. The financial sector is likely seen as
a suitable target that offers opportunities for attacks and positive results for attackers.
Similarly, the informational sector experienced significantly more attacks of a longer
duration and resulting in higher financial damages. Again, these findings suggest that
companies in this sector are seen as suitable targets, offering both attractiveness and
opportunity to attackers. The educational sector experiences longer durations of attacks
but the financial damages are lower in comparison to other sectors. Because educational
sectors are not dependent on online (Internet) business for their revenues (tuition), as
retail and other sectors are, the financial damage effect is lower, suggesting that the
motivation for attacks is not purely about (financial) gains but also includes
considerations of lower risks (weaker defenses). Finally, the retail sector suffered the
highest financial damages but had lower rates and durations of attacks. These results
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show that some sectors are more vulnerable to high financial damages but may not be as
attractive to attackers.
Limitations of the Study
The most significant limitation of this study was use of nonparametric tests. The
proposal called for using 1-way ANOVAs and Pearson correlational analysis to answer
the research questions, but the data violated the assumption of normality. Kruskal-Wallis
tests were substituted for ANOVAs, and Spearman rank-order correlation was substituted
for Pearson product-moment correlation. Nonparametric tests are less robust; as a result,
null hypotheses should be rejected with caution.
In addition to sample size of the business sector groups, a limitation of
nonexperimental quantitative research is lack of ability of the researchers to control the
atmosphere in which the data were gathered from the archival database. These limitations
were introduced in Chapter 1, and they allow for recommendations for further studies,
which will be discussed later in this chapter.
There is no national database recording information on the rate of attack, duration
of attack, and financial loss caused by DoS attacks. Collecting complete information
about targeted business sectors with DoS attacks is not straightforward; some institutions,
businesses, organizations, and agencies did not make these data publicly available. The
lack of precise and definite incident reports makes precise equilibrium calculations
difficult. Finding asset and revenue data, specifically from information companies was a
challenge. There was the possibility of missing important data (variables). The process of
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determining the precise rate of attacks, duration of attacks, and financial losses arising
from DoS can be difficult.
Collecting all possible data on every attempt of DoS attack from all organizations
is impractical. As such, the data in this study are limited to five business sectors in the
U.S. Additionally, the study was limited to U.S. companies that had data on DoS attacks
analytics and company incident reports for the years 2000-2019 and The data that have
not been reported and collected limits the study. Due to the shortcoming of resources and
inconsistent information, this research used various websites. Specifically, the findings of
this study cannot be generalized outside of the U.S. or outside of the five business sectors
included in the study design.
Despite the difficulties of obtaining data and precise reports, this research method
has more depth of information but less generalization proficiency. Despite the
challenging process of collecting data, and the resultant limitations, this research may be
significant to security practitioners and business leaders and contribute new ideas in the
young cyber security research field.
Recommendations
Cyber security attacks have become more problematic and are often bewildering
because of their increased complexity. It has been difficult to find precise theory and
protective systems that address the complexity of these attacks. The interconnected nature
of IT systems has limited the possibility of controlling attacks. Previous research on the
method and technique of DoS attacks has not yet resulted in a theory of the motivations
of targeted attacks. Further research is needed that incorporates multiple disciplines, such
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as sociology, psychology, information systems, and economics in order to comprehend
the motivations of attackers and targeting metrics and to design appropriate approaches to
protect businesses and groups against these attacks.
Due to the difficulty of obtaining reliable data, this study was limited to five
business sectors, and one of those sectors could not be included in all of the statistical
tests due to low population size. Further research could include more business sectors and
more businesses or organizations in the U.S. to ensure the accuracy of the study. Such
studies might require different data collection procedures. Because DoS attacks are but
one type of cyber-security threat, it would be worthwhile to replicate this study with
malware breach attacks and to potentially expand it to include more companies and
possibly various countries.
Finally, there are no consistent, unified, and broadly accepted theories in the
literature about why cyber security attackers attack businesses and there are no clear and
applicable approaches to protecting business sectors from DoS attacks. Future research
could employ additional theoretical frames, in addition to RAT and RCT, to study and
understand the relationship between attackers and defenders.
This research disclosed several findings resulting in possible professional
recommendations that security practitioners and business managers may find pertinent.
The study showed that the financial sector and informational sectors were the most
targeted business sectors with DoS attacks. Moreover, the retail sector and informational
sector suffered the largest financial damages. Finally, informational and educational
sectors experienced the longest duration of attacks. Identifying targeted sectors allows
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professional to take appropriate countermeasures and to erect extra layers of protection to
safeguard businesses.
To overcome the limited use of reported archival public data, researchers need to
combined research techniques to and aim for a more in-depth inquiry. For example, data
could be collected from security defenders as well as from attackers to ensure that only
professionals who met the study’s criteria provided data. Designing and using theory by
obtaining data on attackers’ tactics and strategies and business’ defensive tactics and
strategy (between attacker and defender) can be suitable for framing the recursive
relationship. Accordingly, recommendations for future comprehensive research are as
follows: examine the larger samples, collect data from attackers, and defenders, include
all businesses in the study, and consider longitudinal studies.
Implications
For two decades, the growth of complex DoS attacks on business sectors has
corresponded directly with the growth of the Internet and its use within diverse services.
DoS attacks targeted the availability of services, disrupted online access, disabled
computer functions, and controlled computing systems remotely (Harris & Maymi,
2016). Though protecting companies from targeted DoS attacks is a challenging task that
requires diligence and ingenuity, businesses, organizations, and cyber security
professionals have the legal obligation to protect network communications and defend
against financial losses from attackers. Crucial to tackling DoS attacks is not only
technical know-how but also the ability to identify the most targeted business sectors and
the metrics of attacks.
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This study serves as a common starting point for further discussion and
investigation, while informing a basic and an effective cyber security approach. Leaders
of cyber security defenders not only need to trace technological advancement of attack
tools to bridge the gap between attacks and defense but also need to identify which
business sectors are more targeted (victims) and understand thoroughly the persistent
motivation for targeted attack metrics. This study offers positive social change that
impacts business sectors with DoS attacks and the population in general by increasing
understanding of the motivation behind targeted attacks and improving the protection
system (countermeasures) of businesses. The information from this research affects social
change by presenting business leaders with information crucial to decision-making in
relation to cyber security.
The nature of the research questions called for a quantitative method of research
to investigate the problem. Selecting quantitative inquiry for data collection and analysis
for cyber- security attacks with DoS, targeting companies, and rate of attacks research
was indispensable as it facilitated the understanding of relationships and associations
among the variables (Neuman, 2006). The financial metrics that explains how attackers
collectively target companies with DoS attacks was statistically evaluated. This study
shows there is a significant difference in the financial damage of attacks among business
sectors. The implications of financial damage could potentially impact investors and
cause customer fear.
In this dissertation, I conducted an analysis of targeted attacks using DoS and a
cyber security related literature review used combined theories (RAT and RCT) to
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examine cybercrime as an outcome of a continual interaction between a criminal’s desires
and target preferences (Cornish & Clarke, 2008). These theories may assist researchers
and security professionals in considering and identifying the metrics of sectors targeted
with DoS attacks.
This research is intended to address the gap in literature through its research
design, analytical methods, and results. The outcomes of this research are beneficiary to
business administration and to diverse fields. The findings of this research contribute
information to agencies and organizations and could trigger scholars to further research
the issues raised in the study. The findings of the study, that there are significant
differences in the rate, duration, and financial damages of attacks between business
sectors and that there is a significant relationship between the duration of attacks and
assets, have the potential for positive social change on students, researchers, agencies,
and organizations, which in turn can be utilized to design techniques and program
mechanism towards understanding the targeting metrics and motivation of security
attackers. The results from my research analysis have numerous implications for
measuring and constructing standards for non-traditional forms of research for
advancements in the cyber security field of study.
Conclusion
The exponential growth of Internet technology that enables businesses and
organizations connectivity across the globe has led to an increase in DoS attacks. DoS
attacks are formidable techniques that deplete the availability of the targeted companies’
networking systems. Since 2000, in the U.S., business sectors were targeted with DoS
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attacks at an increasing rate of occurrence and cost. Combating cyber-attacks costs
organizations billions annually. In the U.S. businesses/organizations have experienced the
burden of DoS attacks. DoS attack threats pose a serious risk to business activities. It was
important to find and understand differences among business sectors in attack rates,
duration of attacks, and financial damages as well as the relationship between company
assets and revenues and the duration of attacks and the financial damages resulting from
attacks.
This research was conducted in order to determine whether there were differences
among business sectors in the rate and duration of attacks and in financial loss/damages
as a result of DoS attacks. The second aim was to determine whether there were
relationships between business sector’s assets/revenues and the duration of attacks and
financial damages as a result of DoS attacks. The analyses resulted in the identification of
the differences of the rate, duration, and financial damage at which companies in each
sector are targeted with DoS attacks. Findings from the Kruskal-Wallis test analyses
indicated statistically significant differences among business sectors in the rate of attacks
and duration of attacks as well as financial damage caused by DoS attacks. The
correlation between assets and duration across all sectors is negative and significant
(rs=.247, p=.016,) except within the financial sector in which there is a significant
positive correlation between duration of attacks and assets (rs=.424, p=.008). In other
words, greater assets correspond to a greater duration of DoS attacks. The Spearman’s
correlation indicated that there was not a significant relationship between duration and
revenue or assets/revenue and financial damage.
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While no one measure can entirely prevent all possible attacks, in order to
efficiently manage network (online service) accessibility and reduce the rate of attack,
duration, and financial damages resulting from DoS attack, business managers and cyber
security professionals should continuously evaluate targeted metrics and implement
appropriate preemptive measures that reduce the impact of coordinated DoS attacks on
the system and other business information activity.
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